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Abstract  
This thesis provides the first attempt to predict takeover targets in the Australian context using 
binomial and multinomial logit models, extending the relatively small amount of work focused in 
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Evidence is provided concerning eight main 
hypothesised motivations for takeovers. Our results confirm the contention that such motivations 
are inconsistent both throughout time and across economies. Application of models to a true ex-
ante predictive sample suggests that individual models are quite inaccurate, but that the use of 
certain methodological improvements can produce relatively accurate predictive classifications. 
Multinomial logit models are also compared to binomial logit models to examine whether 
theoretical benefits exist from discrimination between types of targets. Evidence is provided 
suggesting that the binomial model is indeed misspecified, but that it is the most appropriate 
model if the purpose of prediction is investment. Our main empirical finding is that a 
significantly positive abnormal return of 23.37 percent (68.67 percent prior to robustness 
adjustments) may be made from an investment in the commonly predicted targets of logit based 
models. This contradicts the current belief within the extant literature that such returns cannot be 
achieved through the use of binomial logit models for true ex-ante prediction.  
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Introduction and Motivations 
Academic research concerning the ability of discrete choice models to classify and predict 
targets of mergers and acquisitions is not a new phenomenon, as this fascination has a basic 
economic justification. Researchers such as Jensen and Ruback (1983) document that it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the market to predict future targets of mergers and 
acquisitions even three to six months prior to the bid. In addition, these researchers document 
evidence of the significant announcement period abnormal returns of 20 percent to 30 percent 
available to shareholders of firm’s which are subject to takeover bids. Theoretically, if one were 
able to predict such events with accuracy greater than the market, then one would also be able to 
extract some of this abnormal return. In the words of Barnes (1999), if the stock market is a 
casino, then anyone who can predict takeover targets will surely break the bank. But the depth of 
research into takeover prediction has been minimal in comparison to the hundreds of published 
studies in the closely linked area of bankruptcy prediction, even though there is no real economic 
justification for such a fascination. Methodological improvements have also been slowly adapted 
from the bankruptcy prediction literature to the takeover prediction literature, and no direct tests 
have been conducted to examine the impact of these methodological changes. And although the 
argument for the availability of abnormal returns is an appealing one, the fact is that many of 
these studies are unable to predict takeovers with any accuracy greater than the market, as will be 
demonstrated by the following literature review.  
 
The major objective of this paper will be to create and assess the ability of a discrete choice 
model to accurately classify and predict targets of mergers and acquisitions in the Australian 
context. This will be achieved through a modelling procedure known as the nominal logit model, 
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and will be conducted in such a way as to replicate the problem faced by a practitioner 
attempting to predict such events in a future period. Financial and non-financial discriminators 
will be used. Only information available from a specific estimation period will be applied to a 
future prediction period to test the true ex-ante predictive accuracy of such models, rather than 
their ex-post classification abilities which have been heavily documented. Complementary to this 
major objective of the paper will be an assessment of the ability of the model predictions to earn 
the abnormal returns which are supposedly available through the reasoning explained above. 
This objective will also be assessed from the view of a practitioner attempting to predict such 
events. Many researchers have attempted this method but have failed to prove the availability of 
positive abnormal returns.  
 
Such is the depth of the general mergers and acquisitions literature that no less than 15 
theoretical motivations for takeover have been proposed within the corporate finance and 
strategic management literature (Trautwein, 1990). Additionally, researchers such as Walter 
(1994) have provided evidence that these motivations are inconsistent throughout time and 
across economies. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) document that motivations are markedly 
different between hostile (disciplinary) and friendly (synergistic) takeovers. Based on this 
evidence, a minor objective of this thesis will be to examine the motivations for takeover in the 
Australian context. The purpose of this objective is to confirm or refute the select number of 
hypothesised motivations examined in the following literature review, which are based on well 
developed theoretical motivations from the extant mergers and acquisitions literature.  
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This thesis will proceed as follows. Section 1 will briefly examine the extant takeover prediction 
literature and highlight some of the basic methodological flaws of early research. Section 2 will 
focus on the general mergers and acquisitions literature to develop theoretical arguments for 
eight main motivations for takeovers, concluding with a small hypothesis development. Section 3 
will document the methodological process of this paper, and the improvements which have been 
made relative to those studies within the extant literature. Section 4 will present the results of 
these analyses and attempt to synthesise these in comparison to the literature. Section 5 will 
conclude with an examination of the implications of the findings and possible avenues for future 
research within the realms of takeover prediction in the Australian context.  
 
1. Literature Review  
This literature review will begin with an examination of the takeover prediction literature to 
determine whether takeover prediction has been achieved with any robust level of accuracy. 
Following this will be an examination of the theoretical motivations for takeovers in Section 2. 
This will be undertaken from the perspective of both the general mergers and acquisitions 
literature and the takeover prediction literature. Such motivational development is a major 
requirement for the construction of a model with classification accuracy, as these theories allow 
us to discriminate between target and non-target firms on the basis of individual firm 
characteristics. Note that specific motivations for takeovers, such as the well acknowledged 
synergies theories, are not examined because we are unable to use such theories to discriminate 
between target and non-target firms. Section 2.8 will conclude the analysis of the literature by 
developing eight main motivational hypotheses to be examined by this thesis.  
 
6 | P a g e  
 
1.1 The Takeover Prediction Literature 
Takeover prediction became popular within the finance literature in the early 1970’s with 
published US research from Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) and Stevens (1973). Because of the 
close link to bankruptcy classification and prediction, the models of these researchers were based 
on the Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) technique made popular by Altman (1968). 
Stevens (1973) coupled his MDA with a factor analysis to eliminate potential multicollinearity 
problems. Their models were based purely on financial ratios as discriminators between target 
and non-target firms, which conformed to groups such as liquidity, profitability, leverage and 
activity. Also, traditional holdout approaches were applied for predictive accuracy assessment, 
which involved splitting the sample in two – one portion was used to estimate the model and the 
remaining portion was used to assess the classification accuracy. Stevens (1973) reported a 
predictive accuracy
1
 of some 67.5 percent under this methodology, suggesting that takeover 
prediction was viable. On the basis of these results, Belkaoui (1978) and Rege (1984) conducted 
similar analyses in Canada. Belkaoui (1978) confirmed the results of these earlier researchers, 
with a predictive accuracy of 85 percent reported from a similar holdout methodology as the US 
researchers. But concerns were raised by Rege (1984), who was unable to predict accurately. 
These concerns were confirmed by the research of Singh (1971), and Fogelberg, Laurent, and 
McCorkindale (1975).  
 
A new wave of research methodology was adopted in the takeover prediction literature as a 
result of the research of Harris et al (1982). Their probit analysis began a trend in discrete choice 
modelling for takeover prediction which was based on the logit analysis of Ohlson (1980) in the 
                                                          
1
 Predictive accuracy refers to the proportion of targets correctly classified as targets by the model.  
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bankruptcy prediction literature. These researchers presented evidence that the model had 
extremely high explanatory power, but was unable to discriminate between target and non-target 
firms with any degree of accuracy. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) continued this early work and, 
utilising a logit model, presented evidence of a classification accuracy rate of some 90 percent. 
Their results represent the highest predictive accuracy reported by any published takeover 
prediction study, suggesting that takeover prediction was indeed viable.  
 
But there were some obvious methodological limitations within this early literature. The use of 
holdout samples indicated ex-post classification ability rather than ex-ante predictive ability. 
Many other problems were highlighted by the influential paper of Palepu (1986) which utilised 
the logit model. He proposed that the use of state-based prediction samples, where a number of 
targets were matched with non-targets for the same sample period, exaggerated predictive 
accuracies
2
. This was based on the contention that estimated error rates from such samples were 
not indicative of their occurrence in the population. He also proposed the use of an optimal 
cutoff point derivation which considered the decision problem, payoff function, and prior state 
probabilities. The purpose of this was to overcome the use of arbitrary cutoff points
3
 by prior 
research which made the interpretation of reported accuracies meaningless. Using rectified 
methodology and an extremely large US data set, Palepu (1986) provided evidence that the 
ability of the logit model was no better than a chance selection of target and non-target firms. He 
also utilised an ingenious equally weighted portfolio approach, a variation of which will be 
                                                          
2
 For a mathematical proof of the bias impounded into reported accuracies because of the use of state based 
prediction samples, see page 10 of Palepu (1986).  
3
 The significance of the derivation of the cutoff point will be examined in the methodological section of this paper. 
Essentially, the cutoff point is used to classify predicted probabilities of acquisition into predictions that the firm 
will or will not become a takeover target during the sample period.  
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presented in this thesis, to assess whether the predictions of his model were able to earn 
abnormal returns. This provided no evidence that abnormal returns could be made, consistent 
with an inability to predict these events with accuracy greater than the market. Methodological 
improvements were furthered by Barnes (1999), who shifted focus from accurately predicting 
targets to maximising the number of actual targets in the portfolio of predicted targets. This 
maximised returns from a portfolio investment. Although implementing the best methodology 
available, his model was unable to predict any takeover targets – one of the poorest results of any 
published study. Powell (2001) improved this accuracy with another UK analysis, but confirmed 
that abnormal returns were unavailable from application of the binomial model. Wansley et al 
(1983) contradicted this evidence using a state based prediction sample, but as acknowledged by 
Palepu (1986) such methodologies are flawed. 
 
All of the cited literature to this point has been based on financial ratios derived from historical 
cost data, but many researchers have advocated the use of current cost data for the calculation of 
financial ratios. This argument is based on the fact that historical cost data inaccurately proxies 
for undervaluation or overvaluation of a firm, which has been proposed as an important 
motivation for takeover and subsequently an important discriminating variable. Walter (1994) 
made a comparison of current and historical cost models, providing evidence that the inclusion 
of current cost variables improved explanatory power. Although the historical cost model 
exhibited predictive accuracies greater than chance, the current cost model made higher, but not 
positive, returns. Bartley and Boardman (1990) also utilised current cost financial ratios in their 
models, reporting an accuracy of some 82.5 percent. However, this result was problematic as this 
study utilised state-based sampling which exaggerated their reported accuracies.  Note that 
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Bartley and Boardman (1990) actually utilised the MDA methodology like the early researchers. 
Zanakis and Zopounidis (1997) also utilised the MDA methodology for the classification of 
Greek targets and non-targets. Their research indicated classification accuracies significantly 
better than chance for the MDA models although their logit model was unable to achieve such 
accuracies. Barnes (1990) confirmed the accuracy of this technique, providing further evidence 
that the MDA methodology could be utilised to predict with accuracy greater than chance.  
 
The most recent research has been conducted by Powell (1997, 2004) within a UK dataset 
spanning from 1986 to 1995. He utilised a multinomial specification of the logit model which 
attempted to discriminate between non-targets and hostile and friendly targets individually. 
Powell (2004) demonstrates that the prediction of hostile takeover targets alone allows one to 
earn a significantly positive abnormal return of 17 percent over a three year holding period. 
Although a significant result, the portfolio of 117 predicted targets contained only 7 firms which 
were actually taken over. The significantly positive returns to the 7 actual targets would likely be 
washed out by the average zero abnormal returns on the 110 non-target firms in this portfolio of 
predicted targets. This suggests that the result is driven by a chance selection of outperforming 
non-target firms rather than an accurate selection of targets. It is our contention that the result of 
Powell (2004) is spurious.  
 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the extant takeover prediction literature. Firstly, where 
it has been demonstrated that predictive accuracy greater than chance can be achieved, as in the 
case of Walter (1994), these studies have employed samples which are not representative of the 
population of firms. Secondly, where papers have demonstrated the ability to earn significantly 
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positive abnormal returns, such as in Wansley et al (1983) and Powell (2004), the results are 
either based on problematic sampling methodology or are a potentially spurious result. The 
conclusion drawn from the literature is that we are unable to predict takeover targets with 
accuracy greater than chance, and that we are unable to use the predictions of such models to 
earn abnormal returns
4
.  
 
1.2 Implications for Market Efficiency  
Because of the polarised nature of the market efficiency debate, some researchers have attempted 
to relate this argument to the takeover prediction literature. Rege (1984) proposes that an ability 
to accurately predict takeover targets based on purely financial information constitutes an 
infringement of semi-strong market efficiency. His justification is that semi-strong form 
efficiency stipulates that all publicly available information is impounded into the current price of 
a security, suggesting that any implied probability of takeover should be impounded into the 
current price of a stock. His proposal is that if we are able to provide evidence that an abnormal 
return can be made from an investment in predicted targets, then we have evidenced a violation 
of semi-strong form market efficiency. Barnes (1990) furthers this in the context of the random 
walk hypothesis (weak form efficient markets hypothesis); suggesting that future price changes 
should not be able to be forecasted from past price changes and existing information. Although 
this is a theoretically appealing argument against market efficiency, most researchers have 
neglected to draw such conclusions. This is based on the belief of researchers such as Fama 
(1998) that market efficiency tests of this from are joint tests of the applicability of the returns 
model used to calculate abnormal returns, making it extremely difficult to prove market 
                                                          
4
 Inability to earn abnormal returns implies an inability to predict takeovers more accurately than the market, which 
is based on the reasoning of Palepu (1986).  
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inefficiency. Fama (1998) also argues that there must be consistent evidence of an ability to earn 
significantly positive abnormal returns to prove the existence of an anomaly.  
 
2. Hypothesised Motivations for Mergers and Acquisitions 
2.1 The Inefficient Management  Hypothesis and the Market for Corporate Control  
Explanation of the inefficient management hypothesis requires acknowledgement of the 
corporate structure of the modern firm. As management are generally not majority shareholders 
in these firms, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest this causes an agency problem as decision 
making and risk bearing are separated between management and stakeholders
5
. Although a 
principal-agent problem may exist, Fama (1980) and Manne (1965) theorised that a mechanism 
existed which ensured that management acted in the interests of the vast number of small non-
controlling shareholders
6
. They proposed that a market for corporate control existed in which 
alternative management teams competed for the rights to control corporate assets. This is based 
on the premise that the threat of acquisition would align management objectives with those of 
stakeholders as management would surely be terminated in the event of an acquisition for 
inefficient management of the firm’s assets. Although Fama (1980) proposes that this is an 
effective mechanism to ensure that target management act in the best interests of shareholders, 
Martin and McConnell (1991) and Manne (1965) propose that deviations from efficient 
management provide an effective motivation for takeovers. This contention is confirmed by 
Jensen and Ruback (1983), who suggest that both capital gains and increased dividends are 
available to an acquirer who can eliminate the inefficiencies created by target management, with 
the attractiveness of the firm for takeover increasing with the level of inefficiency. Manne (1965) 
                                                          
5
 Stakeholders are generally considered to be both stock and bond holders of a corporation.  
6
 We take the interests of shareholders to be in the maximization of the present value of the firm.  
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contends that the stock price of a firm must be positively related to the efficiency of the firm for 
this to occur, providing capital gains to those able to eliminate inefficiencies. This disciplinary 
motivation for takeovers suggests that inefficiently managed firms are acquired by management 
teams who believe that they can more efficiently employ the assets of the firm (Fama, 1980).  
 
Accordingly, the takeover prediction literature has attempted to utilise the inefficient 
management hypothesis to discriminate between target and non-target firms. Three main groups 
of financial ratios have been utilised as proxies for management efficiency. The use of proxies is 
based on the contention of Manne (1965) that the true efficiency of the firm is only observable 
by internal parties. These include operating performance, stock price performance, and activity 
performance. Early research by Stevens (1973) and Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) pioneered the 
use of profitability ratios, usually based on variables such as EBIT and scaled by net assets or 
total assets, to proxy for management efficiency. Palepu (1986) utilised a ROE measurement, 
and Walter utilised a ROA measurement, both of which were found to be insignificant in 
explaining acquisition likelihood. Barnes (1999) contradicted these early researchers and the 
inefficient management hypothesis, providing evidence that higher profitability increased 
acquisition likelihood. As noted, appropriate operation of the market for corporate control 
requires a positive relationship between management efficiency and the market value of the firm. 
Based on this reasoning, Palepu (1986) utilised a Cumulative Abnormal Return variable. He 
provided evidence that this was significantly negatively related to acquisition likelihood, 
confirming the inefficient management hypothesis as inefficiently managed firms had higher 
estimated acquisition likelihoods. Researchers such as Barnes (1999) and Dietrich and Sorensen 
(1984) utilised activity ratios as proxies for management efficiency, as they indicate the ability of 
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assets to generate revenue
7
. Both documented that such measurements were significantly 
negatively related to acquisition likelihood. Mixed evidence for the inefficient management 
hypothesis has been confirmed by the general merger and acquisitions literature. Researchers 
such as Martin and McConnell (1991) have provided significant evidence in favour of this 
hypothesis, but researchers such as Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) have provided contradictory 
evidence using similar operating and stock price performance measurements. Contradictory 
evidence has been confirmed in the Australian context by Bugeja and Walter (1995) and 
McDougall and Round (1986). Although inefficient management is commonly accepted as a 
strong theoretical motivation for takeovers, the empirical evidence is mixed.  
 
2.2 The Market for Corporate Control and the Undervaluation Hypotheses 
 
2.2.1 Market to Book Hypothesis 
The Market to Book Hypothesis was developed on the basis of the Market for Corporate Control 
and the Inefficient Management Hypothesis. Manne (1965) proposes that a deflated stock price is 
indicative of the markets belief that an alternative management team exists who could more 
efficiently employ the firms’ assets, providing an opportunity for realisation of capital gains. But 
Palepu (1986) suggests an alternative explanation, like Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983), that undervaluation simply measures the potential economic 
gain available to an acquirer who is able to change the markets perception concerning the true 
value of the firm’s assets. Eddey (1991) furthers this contention, suggesting that undervalued 
firms are more attractive for takeovers as they allow immediate economic gains to be realised 
                                                          
7
 Activity ratios such as the Operating Revenue/Total Assets variable utilised by most researchers are extremely 
informative as they indicate the efficiency of management in generating revenue for a given level of assets.  
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through the process of asset stripping. Although the above researchers propose competing 
explanations, they all suggest that the attractiveness for takeover will increase with the level of 
undervaluation of the firm. Golbe and White (1988) document that aggregate merger and 
acquisition activity increases in period of low Q ratios
8
, providing general evidence consistent 
with this contention. The takeover prediction literature has also attempted to utilise these 
variables to explain acquisition likelihood. Walter (1994) and Bartley and Boardman (1990) 
provided evidence that acquisition likelihood is negatively related to such variables, confirming 
that undervalued firms have a higher likelihood of acquisition. Other studies which do not have 
access to current cost data utilise a close proxy for this value, being the market to book ratio. 
This variable is an inefficient proxy of the Q ratio because net assets, as a historical cost, are a 
poor measurement of the replacement value of assets
9
. Palepu (1986) and Barnes (1999) 
provided evidence that the M/B ratio is insignificant in the discrimination between target and 
non-target firms, a result most likely driven by the empirical limitations of this variable. 
Although undervaluation is a theoretically appealing motivation for takeovers, studies employing 
variables based on historical costs have been unable to document it as a significant motivation 
for takeovers.  
 
2.2.2 Price to Earnings Hypothesis 
The P/E ratio has also been proposed as an explanatory variable in takeover prediction studies, as 
some researchers believe that it is a measurement of both management efficiency and relative 
                                                          
8
 Note that Q ratios in this context measure the ratio of the market value of assets to the replacement value of assets.  
9
 The M/B ratio should be a more accurate representation of the Q ratio in the Australian context because companies 
are regularly required to update the book value of their assets, making the value of net assets more representative of 
their true replacement values.  
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valuation. Barnes (1999) utilises the modern interpretation of this variable, suggesting that it 
indicates the markets expectation of the profitability of the firm in the short to medium term 
future. Powell (1997) suggests that this variable indicates the markets expectation of 
management’s ability to achieve earnings growth into the future, as high (low) values indicate 
higher (lower) expectations for earnings growth. One could also make a comparison to the M/B 
ratio, as some believe that the P/E ratio measures the relative valuation of the firm’s earnings, 
which is entirely consistent with the other explanations. But Palepu (1986) offers an alternative 
explanation which is a little more illogical than that of Barnes (1999). He suggests that a firm 
with a low P/E multiple will be a likely acquisition target for an acquirer with a high P/E ratio 
because the earnings of the acquired firm will be valued at the multiple of the acquirer, allowing 
an immediate capital gain to be realised by the acquirer. Although plausible, most researchers 
take the first explanation as the basis for the inclusion of this variable for discrimination between 
target and non-target firms. Empirically, all takeover prediction studies cited since the earliest 
study of Stevens (1973) have documented that this variable is insignificant in explaining 
acquisition likelihood. As for the M/B hypothesis, the empirical evidence in favour of the P/E 
hypothesis is weak.  
 
2.3 Managerial Behaviour and the Growth-Resource Mismatch Hypothesis  
This hypothesis is based on two commonly accepted resource allocation problems:  
 
2.3.1 Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow  
Jensen (1986) furthers the examination of the principal-agent problem explored within the 
inefficient management hypothesis to incorporate arguments concerning the level of free cash 
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flow that a firm possesses
10
. His analysis focuses on firms which have achieved high levels of 
growth in recent periods, and have a high level of free cash flow, but no profitable investment 
opportunities. The proposal is that management will be reluctant to return excess funds to 
shareholders, as this would reduce assets under management and subsequently the value of 
management to shareholders along with their remuneration. This argument is based on the 
theoretical and empirical evidence of Marris (1963), which suggests that management are more 
concerned with the size of their firms than shareholder welfare maximisation as their pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary numeration is more heavily related to size. Such agency hypotheses suggest 
that even though these firms have no profitable investment opportunities available, they will still 
invest in negative Net Present Value (NPV) projects, which constitutes a resource misallocation. 
Jensen (1986) suggests that the market value of the firm is discounted by the expected agency 
costs of free cash flow, which can be rectified through merger or acquisition with a growing firm 
which requires the use of these excess funds.  
 
2.3.2 Corporate Decisions under Information Asymmetry  
Myers and Majluf (1984) analyse the opposite situation, where a firm has profitable investment 
opportunities but has no financial slack available and must issue stock to raise the required 
capital. Their model assumes that information asymmetry exists between stockholders and 
management, as management is unable to convey the true profitability of the investment 
opportunity to shareholders. In such a case, the issuance of stock results in a negative stock price 
reaction for the issuing firm, resulting in a large cost for existing shareholders. In the case that 
the loss in value for the existing shareholders outweighs the positive NPV of the project, 
                                                          
10
 We take the definition of free cash flow to be cash flows in excess of those required for positive NPV investment 
opportunities and normal levels of financial slack.  
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management of the firm will not undertake the issuance of stock or investment. A reverse 
resource misallocation problem exists to that proposed by Jensen (1986), as these researchers 
propose that an underinvestment in positive NPV projects occurs. Myers and Majluf (1984) 
provide evidence that the elimination of such misallocations, through merger or acquisition, can 
result in a positive value impact.  
 
2.3.3 Growth Resource Mismatch as a Motivation for Takeovers  
Smith and Kim (1994) combine these two resource allocation problems to create a theoretically 
strong motivation for takeovers. They propose that a combination of these firms through merger 
or acquisition, the “slack-poor” and the “slack-rich” firm, will be an optimal solution to the two 
respective resource allocation problems. The slack-poor firm proposed by Myers and Majluf 
(1984) will have the required funds to invest in the positive NPV project, whilst the slack-rich 
firm proposed by Jensen (1986) will have no longer have the incentive to invest in negative NPV 
projects as the size of the firm has been dramatically increased. The result should be a market 
value for the combined entity which exceeds the sum of the individual values, suggesting a 
synergistic type of benefit. Smith and Kim (1994) subsequently provide empirical evidence that 
the merger of a slack-poor and slack-rich firm creates more value than that of two similar firms 
where the merger is believed to simply exacerbate the resource misallocation problem.  
 
The takeover prediction literature has attempted to utilise this motivational hypothesis to 
differentiate between target and non-target firms. Researchers such as Barnes (1999), Palepu 
(1986), and Powell (2001) hypothesise that firms which possess high growth opportunities / low 
resources, or low growth opportunities / high resources, are more likely to be acquisition targets. 
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Inefficient proxies have been used by these researchers for future growth rates, such as current 
growth rates, as we are unable to accurately observe these variables. Barnes (1999) utilised a 
capital expenditure variable to more appropriately measure growth opportunities. Financial 
resource availability has generally been measured through variables such as current liquidity and 
leverage. The problem with these measurements is that they focus only on the attributes of 
potential targets, and are unable to compare these to characteristics of potential acquirers, 
contradicting the combinational nature of the theory. Even so, empirical evidence has strongly 
confirmed the growth-resource mismatch hypothesis. Palepu (1986) utilised a dummy and a set 
of continuous variables which indicated significance for this hypothesis. This method was 
replicated by the analysis of Barnes (1999) with continuous variables and Powell (2001) with 
dummy and continuous variables. Both of these researchers documented significant growth-
resource imbalances for targets. Walter (1994) and Bartley and Boardman (1990) contradicted 
them, providing no evidence of statistical significance. Powell (1997, 2001) also included a Free 
Cash Flow measurement to examine for an agency cost of free cash flow problem individually, 
but documented insignificance
11
.  
 
2.3.4 Dividend Payout Hypothesis  
As suggested, past growth ratios are an inefficient measurement of future growth opportunities. 
Stevens (1973) and Harris et al (1982) utilised the dividend payout ratio as a more appropriate 
proxy for the true investment opportunities available for a firm. This is based on the theory of 
Myers and Majluf (1984), which suggests that it is optimal for firms to hold adequate financial 
slack for investment opportunities, rather than distributing it to shareholders as stock issuance 
                                                          
11
 We believe that the FCF variable is more applicable as a measurement of profitability under the inefficient 
management hypothesis.  
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results in a large cost for existing investors. Interpretation of this theory suggests that firms 
which are paying out less of their earnings are aggregating financial slack to exploit future 
investment opportunities which they believe exist. This theory exploits observed managerial 
behaviour to extract information concerning the future opportunities of the firm. Empirically, 
Harris (1982) and Stevens (1973) found the dividend payout ratio to be insignificant in 
discriminating between target and non-target firms. But Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) 
documented a significant negative relationship between the payout ratio and acquisition 
likelihood. More recent research by Barnes (1999), Palepu (1986) and Powell (1997) has 
neglected to include the payout ratio as a discriminatory variable. Overall, the theoretical and 
empirical evidence is quite strongly in favour of the growth resource mismatch hypothesis, 
although evidence in favour of the dividend payout hypothesis is generally weaker.  
 
2.4 Capital Structure and the Inefficient Financial Structure Hypothesis 
Lewellen (1971) believes that an alternative exists to operational synergies as a motivation for 
takeovers, suggesting that financial synergies may have been a motivation for conglomerate US 
mergers of the 1960’s. His analysis is based on the traditional model of capital structure, which 
suggests that increases in debt to reasonable levels will not dramatically increase the required 
return on equity. He suggests increases in debt in such firms should increase the residual equity 
value of the company, as high return demanding equity is replaced with low coupon debt. The 
implication of this traditional theory is that, if a merger partner is not utilising its latent debt 
capacity, then a combination with a firm which utilises this capacity will realise a valuation gain 
known as a financial synergy. Such a financial synergy can also be explained within the well 
known Miller and Modigliani (1964) model, but in it’s cum corporate taxes form. M&M suggest 
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that increases in debt to reasonable levels will increase the residual equity value of the firm. Such 
an outcome confirms that a merger of firms where either is not utilising their latent debt capacity 
will result in a financial synergy being realised. Note that existence of financial synergies of this 
form requires that the existing suboptimal capital structure of a merger partner is unable to be 
eliminated without effecting the merger or acquisition. This could result from such things as 
management incompetence in capital structure planning, or an inability to gain access to the 
required debt facilities.   
 
But Barnes (1999) suggests that potential financial synergies may exist from combining two 
firms where one of these firms has higher than optimal levels of debt in their capital structure. 
According to the traditional theory presented in Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2005), an optimal 
capital structure exists at a medium debt capacity, as increases in debt past these levels will be 
extremely costly because of increased risk. This conforms to the view of Jensen (1986), that an 
optimal capital structure exists which equates the marginal costs and marginal benefits of debt. 
This suggests than an equivalent financial synergy may be made available when a potential 
merger partner has an over-levered position. The rectification of such problems through merger 
will result in an increase in the residual equity valuation. To understand this from a different 
perspective, we must realise that high levels of leverage make firms Earnings per Share (EPS) 
extremely volatile. This volatility significantly reduces EPS in times of recession, flowing on 
into market values and increasing the vulnerability of the firm for bankruptcy or takeover. The 
proposition of Barnes (1999) is that during recessions, acquisition of a firm which is 
experiencing issues from an extremely levered position, and rectifying this deficiency, will result 
in a financial synergy.  
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On the basis of these theories, Leverage has been included as an explanatory variable in many 
models of takeover prediction. The early models of Stevens (1973) examined whether this was a 
significant motivational factor, with mixed success in discriminating between target and non-
target firms. Barnes (1999), Walter (1994), and Powell (1997) have deemed this variable to be 
insignificant for discrimination. However, Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) and Palepu (1986) 
found that leverage is significantly negatively related to acquisition likelihood, consistent with 
the interpretation of Lewellen (1971). Powell (2001) believed that this variable could also be 
used to measure financial resource availability for the purposes of the growth-resource mismatch 
hypothesis, as under-utilised debt capacity could suggest excess financial slack. Although the 
theoretical argument for inefficient financial structure as a motivation for takeovers is strong, the 
empirical evidence for such a financial motivation for mergers is mixed.  
 
2.5 Takeover Activity Waves and the Industry Disturbance Hypothesis 
Since the earliest mergers and acquisitions literature, researchers have acknowledged that 
takeovers occur in distinct waves which cluster both throughout time and across industries. Gort 
(1969) was one of the first to explore the concept that industry disturbances created such wave 
activity. He postulated that economic shocks (such as deregulation, changes in input and output 
prices, etc) caused expectations concerning future cash flows to become more variable, 
increasing the likelihood that a potential acquirer would value the target shares at a higher level 
than their current holders and resulting in a takeover. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) provided 
significant empirical evidence of this through analysis of the US experience during the 1980’s, 
suggesting that such events cluster by industry throughout time. But they believe that the waves 
22 | P a g e  
 
result from the fact that mergers, acquisitions, and leveraged buyouts are the least cost method 
for response to economic shocks. This reasoning is confirmed by Andrade, Mitchell, and 
Stafford (2001). Either way, both theories suggest that mergers occur in distinct waves as a result 
of economic shocks.  
 
But Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) believe that such waves may exist even without 
economic shocks as the “trigger”. Their theoretical second price auction framework suggests that 
merger waves may simply result from overvaluation
12
 in the general market place, and that 
market undervaluation may halt such waves. This is based on the contention that during periods 
of market overvaluation, the estimation error associated with synergy valuation is high; leading 
to more bid proposals and acceptances as targets will more readily accept takeover bids. This 
confirms the general evidence of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) that such waves occur in 
periods of market overvaluation, and similar behavioural explanations proposed by Gugler, 
Mueller, and Yurtoglu (2005). Whichever theoretical cause of industry takeover activity one 
chooses to support, all theories and empirical evidence support the contention that takeover 
activity clusters both throughout time and within industries.  
 
Although a widely accepted motivational factor in the general literature, the takeover prediction 
studies have generally neglected this variable. Walter (1994) suggested that such variables are of 
the upmost importance, as they create a form of control variable for differential acquisition rates 
across industries. Palepu (1986) created an extremely simplistic dummy variable which indicated 
whether a bid had been made within the firm’s industry within the past twelve month period, 
                                                          
12
 In this case, overvaluation refers to the ratio of the market value of assets to the replacement value of assets, or the 
Q ratio.  
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which was indicated to be significantly positively related to acquisition likelihood. The problem 
with this variable is that it accounts for a continuous variable with a dichotomous variable, 
creating a specification error which may have led to inaccuracy. Walter (1994) was the only 
other published researcher to utilise such a variable. He included a categorical variable relating 
merger and acquisition activity in an industry to the average level for all industries. This was also 
found to be a significant discriminating variable. The advantage of the variable of Walter (1994) 
is that it accounted for differences in the number of firms within each industry, which is an 
important consideration as firms are disproportionately distributed across industry classifications. 
But the problem with this variable is that it does not account for different “normal” levels of 
takeover activity between industries, as heavily regulated industries would expect to have lower 
acquisition frequencies than other lightly regulated industries. Overall, the evidence is 
significantly in favour of the industry disturbance hypothesis as a determinant of acquisition 
likelihood. Ignorance of this variable by many researchers may have contributed to their 
inabilities to predict with any degree of accuracy.   
 
2.6 Growth Maximisation and Size Hypotheses  
The takeover prediction literature has also developed a distinct hypothesis which related the 
probability of acquisition to the size of the potential target firm. Barnes (1999) explains this 
relationship through the Growth Maximisation hypothesis of Marris (1963). He proposes that 
management are more concerned with the size of their firm than in maximising shareholder 
welfare, as their pecuniary and non-pecuniary remuneration is more closely related to size than 
performance. This explanation is extremely similar to the agency cost of free cash flow argument 
forwarded by Jensen (1986) in Section 2.3.1. This hypothesis suggests a positive relationship 
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between the size of a firm and its acquisition likelihood, as management should be attempting to 
maximise the size of their firm through the acquisition of the largest potential targets.  
 
An alternative argument has been proposed within the takeover prediction literature by Palepu 
(1986) and Walter (1994). Palepu (1986) contends that as the size of the target becomes larger; 
the transaction and integration costs of the deal will become larger, reducing the viability of the 
transaction to the acquirer. Larger target firms may also attempt to defend themselves, which can 
be extremely costly for the acquirer in terms of transactions costs and the actual price paid for 
the target. Walter (1994) relies on a probability argument, suggesting that the number of 
potential acquirers of a target firm is reduced with the size of the firm because larger targets 
demand larger acquirers with the resources to enact the transaction. Both of these studies theorise 
that a negative relationship should exist between acquisition likelihood and the size of a firm, 
which suggests that targets are smaller than their non-target counterparts. Empirically, Walter 
(1994), Palepu (1986), Harris et al (1982), Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) and Powell (2001) have 
provided significant evidence that acquisition likelihood is negatively related to size
13
. As many 
general merger and acquisition studies have also confirmed this negative relationship, the 
conclusion is that size is a significant motivation for takeovers, with smaller size increasing 
acquisition likelihood.  
 
2.7 Differential Motivations for Hostile and Friendly Takeovers  
It has become widely acknowledged through research by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) 
that significant motivational differences exist between hostile and friendly takeovers. Their 
                                                          
13
 Note that size has been measured in the takeover prediction literature through variables such as Net Assets, the log 
of Net Assets, and Market Capitalisation.  
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analysis suggested that hostile takeovers are enacted for disciplinary reasons, as described within 
the inefficient management hypothesis, but that friendly takeovers are enacted more regularly to 
exploit potential synergistic benefits. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) have confirmed such 
contentions, providing evidence that friendly takeovers are enacted for synergistic reasons rather 
than disciplinary ones. Although most takeover prediction studies have grouped all targets into a 
single category within a binomial model, Powell (1997) attempted to discriminate between the 
targets of friendly and hostile takeovers with a multinomial logit model. Targets of hostile 
takeovers were found to be generally larger (older), have lower levels of leverage, and inefficient 
managed (underperforming) relative to their friendly counterparts. Targets of friendly takeovers 
generally exhibit a growth resource mismatch, which suggests a synergistic motivation for 
takeover of such firms. These results are confirmed in the subsequent study of Powell (2004), 
and suggest that the inability of some binomial models to provide evidence of the inefficient 
management hypothesis may simply be a result of model misspecification. Powell (2004) also 
attempted to predict targets of hostile takeovers, rather than targets of hostile and friendly 
takeovers. He provided evidence that an abnormal return of 17 percent could be made over a 
three year holding period, a result we believe is spurious for reasons outlined in Section 1.1. 
Overall, this evidence suggests that care must be taken when analysing the results of binomial 
studies which group takeover targets into a single category, as heterogeneous motivational 
factors for different groups of targets may lead to spurious and inconsistent results. The 
theoretical and empirical limitations of non discrimination between these categories will be 
discussed further in Section 3.14 of this thesis.  
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2.8 Motivational Hypotheses 
As the literature review demonstrates, there exists considerable ambiguity as to the motivations 
for mergers and acquisitions. Even though these motivational theories are inconsistently 
examined in the literature, they provide a clear theoretical base on which to build takeover 
prediction models. Eight main hypotheses are proposed, the significance of which will be 
examined within the methodologies outlined in this paper.   
 
The first, and probably most commonly accepted motivational theory for takeovers is the 
inefficient management hypothesis. Also known as the disciplinary motivation for takeovers, this 
theory has been disguised in many forms since its initial proposal by Manne (1965). The 
suggestion of the inefficient management hypothesis is that inefficiently managed firms are 
acquired by more efficiently managed firms, and forms the first hypothesis of this thesis:  
 
H1: Greater inefficiency of management will lead to an increased likelihood of acquisition.  
 
A number of different roles have been proposed for undervaluation within the realms of 
acquisition likelihood. Some believe that this simply indicates the value of gains to be made by 
an acquirer upon market revaluation of acquired assets, whilst the more traditional theorists 
suggest close links to the inefficient management hypothesis. Although these are competing 
explanations, they suggest a consistent impact of undervaluation on acquisition likelihood, 
leading to the second hypothesis known as the undervaluation hypothesis: 
 
H2: Greater undervaluation of the firm will lead to an increased likelihood of acquisition.  
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As suggested, the P/E ratio is closely linked to this undervaluation hypothesis. Although 
alternative explanations have also been proposed for the impact of P/E on acquisition likelihood, 
the directional impact proposed by these competing theories is consistent, leading to the third 
hypothesis of this thesis which will be referred to as the P/E hypothesis:  
 
H3: Greater Price to Earnings Ratios will lead to a decreased likelihood of acquisition.  
 
Unlike the above hypotheses, the growth resource mismatch hypothesis has had only one distinct 
line of reasoning proposed. This constitutes the fourth hypothesis of this thesis, but note that the 
variables used to examine this hypothesis separately capture growth and resource availability: 
 
H4: Firms which possess low growth / high resource combinations or high growth / low resource 
combinations will have an increased likelihood of acquisition.  
 
Although the growth resource mismatch hypothesis has not been challenged from a theoretical 
perspective, many researchers have attempted to improve the measurement of this theory by 
utilising different proxies for the future growth prospects of a firm. From this literature the 
dividend payout hypothesis was created, which suggests that firms which payout less of their 
earnings are doing so to maintain enough financial slack to exploit future growth opportunities 
expected to arise:  
 
H5: Greater payout ratios will lead to a decreased likelihood of acquisition.  
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Capital structure has played such a major part in the financial theory of a firm, and thus plays a 
major part in the main creative and destructive forces in the market for corporate control – 
mergers and acquisitions. Some disagreement exists as to the impact of high and low leverage on 
acquisition likelihood. This paper proposes a hypothesis consistent with the general takeover and 
takeover prediction literature, forming the sixth hypothesis known as the inefficient financial 
structure hypothesis:  
 
H6: Greater leverage will lead to a decreased likelihood of acquisition.  
 
Recent interest in the mergers and acquisitions literature has shifted focus to the analysis of 
waves of activity both across economies and within specific industries. These M&A activity 
wave theories have a consistent implication for takeover prediction studies, which creates the 
industry disturbance hypothesis as the seventh hypothesised determinant of acquisition 
likelihood:  
 
H7: Greater industry merger and acquisition activity will lead to an increased likelihood of 
acquisition.   
 
The final hypothesised motivation for takeovers is unique to the takeover prediction studies. It is 
obvious that size will have an impact on acquisition likelihood, although competing theories 
concerning this impact have been proposed. It seems more plausible from a probability 
perspective that smaller firms will have a greater likelihood of acquisition, which is confirmed 
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by a significant amount of empirical literature. The proposition of this paper forms the following 
size hypothesis:  
 
H8: Greater size of a specific firm will lead to a decreased likelihood of acquisition.  
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Discriminating Variables  
For each of the eight hypothesised motivations for takeover developed in Section 2.8, a number 
of explanatory variables have been proposed by the literature. Aggregation of all of the financial 
discriminators proposed in bankruptcy and takeover prediction studies would indicate that more 
than 100 of these ratios exist (Barnes, 1999). Many of these variables are likely to be collinear, 
which can make examination of the motivation hypotheses extremely difficult as estimators will 
be inefficient. The aim of our variable selection is to maintain a complete representation of the 
hypothesised motivations for takeovers, whilst attempting to eliminate the bulk of the 
multicollinearity problem. This is achieved by removing any variables which have similar 
numerators or denominators, as this is generally the cause of the collinearity problem.  
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Dependent Variable  
1 – Firm became a target during the sample period (including all unsuccessful/withdrawn and 
successful takeover bids announced during these periods).  
0 – Firm did not become a takeover target during the sample period.  
 
Inefficient Management Hypothesis  
1. ROA (EBIT/Total Assets – Outside Equity Interests)  
2. ROE (NPAT/Shareholders Equity – Outside Equity Interests) 
3. EBIT Margin (EBIT/Operating Revenue)  
4. EBIT/Shareholders Equity 
5. FCF/Total Assets  
6. Dividend/Shareholders Equity  
7. Growth in EBIT over past year 
 
Activity Ratio 
8. Asset Turnover (Net Sales/Total Assets)  
 
Undervaluation Hypothesis  
9. Market to book ratio (Market Value of Securities/Net Assets)  
 
P/E Hypothesis  
10. Price/Earnings Ratio  
 
Growth Resource Mismatch Hypothesis  
11. Growth in Sales (Operating Revenue) over past year  
12. Capital Expenditure/Total Assets  
13. Current Ratio (Current Assets/Current Liabilities)  
14. (Current Assets – Current Liabilities)/Total Assets  
15. Quick Assets/Current Liabilities (Current Assets – Inventory)/Current Liabilities  
 
Dividend Payout Hypothesis  
16. Dividend Payout Ratio  
 
Inefficient Financial Structure  
17. Net Gearing (Short Term Debt + Long Term Debt)/Shareholders Equity  
18. Net Interest Cover  (EBIT/Interest Expense)  
19. Total Liabilities/Total Assets  
20. Long Term Debt/Total Assets  
 
Industry Disturbance Hypothesis  
21. It is proposed that an industry specific ratio of takeover activity is used. The numerator will be 
the total bids launched in a given year for a specific industry, whilst the denominator will be 
the average number of bids launched in that industry for the prior four years. Both the 
numerator and denominator will be calculated by dividing the total number of bids announced 
in an industry by the number of firms in that industry. This will create a relative value for 
industry takeover activity that accounts for different levels of “normal” merger and acquisition 
activity between industries.  
 
Firm Size Hypothesis  
22. Ln (Total Assets)  
23. Net Assets  
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3.2 The Logistic Regression Model 
   [1] 
 
 
 
  [2] 
 
To model the discrete outcomes of bid or no bid proposed by the variable list in Section 3.1, we 
require a discrete choice modelling procedure which is able to overcome specific problems 
relating to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. A logistic regression model is used 
by this thesis because of a number of theoretical advantages over alternative models. The logit 
(Li) is estimated according to Equation 1 using a set of quantitative variables (zi) as 
discriminators between target and non-target firms, as listed in Section 3.1. Consistent with the 
literature, this thesis designates the dependent variable (yi) as one if the firm was bid for during 
the sample period, and zero otherwise. This means that the estimated event probability (pi) of the 
logit model in Equation 2 is an estimated probability of acquisition for an individual firm. This 
method can be applied to a future set of explanatory variables, in a similar way to a linear 
regression model, to estimate acquisition probabilities for future periods. To classify these 
estimated acquisition probabilities into predictions that firms will or will not be taken over, we 
must use a cutoff probability methodology explained in Section 3.10.  
 
  [3] 
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The logit model has a number of inherent advantages over the Linear Probability Model (LPM), 
which is equivalent to Ordinary Linear Regression with a discrete dependent variable. In the 
presence of a binary dependent variable, the logit is able to estimate unbiased, efficient, and 
consistent parameters, whilst the estimators of the LPM will be inconsistent and inefficient. This 
is caused by the binary dependent variable, which causes the error term to follow a binary 
distribution – violating a major assumption of linear regression. One of the major disadvantages 
of the LPM is that it stipulates a linear relationship between acquisition likelihood and the 
explanatory variables. The logit model stipulates a linear relationship between the log odds of 
acquisition (the logit, Li) and the explanatory variables, suggesting a non-linear relationship 
between acquisition probability and the explanatory variables determined by the logit. Equation 
3 highlights the advantages of this relationship. This partial derivative indicates the impact of a 
change in the explanatory variable on acquisition likelihood. At high and low acquisition 
probabilities, the effect of an explanatory variable on acquisition probability (measured by β) is 
reduced as pi(1-pi) is reduced relative to where pi = 0.5. If a firm is clearly defined as a target or 
non-target and thus has a high or low pi, a larger change in the explanatory variables is required 
to change the classification of this firm. Conversely, the LPM stipulates that the partial derivative 
is always equal to β, suggesting a linear relationship. The log odds ratio of the logit also 
stipulates that estimated acquisition probabilities remain between the logical bounds of 0 and 1, 
which is not achievable by the linear form of the LPM.  
 
Anyone with knowledge of the takeover prediction literature will recognise that MDA is the 
dominant discrete choice model employed by early studies. Barnes (1990) and Zanakis and 
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Zopounidis (1997) have also provided favourable results for this technique in comparison to the 
logit model, as documented in Section 1.1. But the logit has a number of inherent advantages 
over this technique as well. The factor loadings estimated within the MDA technique have no 
logical interpretation, but the parameters in the logit model have logical interpretations which are 
similar to coefficient estimates in the linear regression model. Also, MDA models are based on 
the strict assumptions of multivariate normality. Given that financial ratios are now 
acknowledged to be anything but multivariate normally distributed (Zanakis and Zopounidis, 
1997), MDA models are likely to be problematic. Barnes (1999) acknowledges this problem 
himself, even though his earlier work utilised the MDA methodology (Barnes, 1990). The logit 
model requires no distributive assumptions concerning the explanatory variables, and is also able 
to examine multiple discrete outcomes, rather than simple binary outcomes. For these reasons, 
the nominal logit model to has been employed for the purposes of this study.  
 
3.3 Explanation of Estimation and Prediction Sample Construction  
Two samples will be required to perform the analysis in a way that mimics the problem faced by 
a practitioner attempting to predict these events into the future. Our samples are constructed such 
that targets and non-targets from calendar years 2003 and 2004 will be used to estimate a model 
which predicts targets and non-targets for the 2005 and 2006 calendar years. The first sample 
will be used to estimate the models parameters, and will subsequently be referred to as the 
estimation sample. Four different models will be estimated to examine different methodologies, 
all of which utilise the calendar years of 2003 and 2004 to designate target and non-target firms.  
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Table One – Explanation of the Estimation Sample  
Estimation Model 
Description 
Estimation Sample 
Financial Data 
Target/Non-target 
Designation Period  Industry Adjustment  
Single Raw 2002 2003 and 2004 No 
Single Adjusted 2002 2003 and 2004 Yes  
Combined Raw Average (2001, 2002) 2003 and 2004 No  
Combined Adjusted  Average (2001, 2002) 2003 and 2004 Yes  
 
The single models in Table One will utilise only one year of pre-sample financial data to 
estimate the model, that is, only 2002 financials. The combined models will utilise an average of 
the two years of pre-sample financial data, that is, the average of 2001 and 2002
14
. The purpose 
of these averages is to remove any random fluctuation in the variables and provide clear 
indications of the condition of the firm. Walter (1994) proposed that such practices increase the 
predictive accuracy of the models. The raw models will use unadjusted (raw) financial ratios, as 
were utilised by many of the earlier researchers, whilst the adjusted models will utilise industry 
adjusted financial ratios. Such practices have been implemented since the study of Palepu 
(1986), who began a trend in the takeover prediction literature by introducing population scaling. 
Platt and Platt (1990) propose that such scaling may increase the predictive accuracy of such 
models as it should enable the model to make more accurate predictions both across industries 
and through time where raw ratios would be meaningless. The first reason is that average 
financial ratios are inconsistent across industries, as they reflect the relative efficiencies of 
production commonly employed in those industries. The second reason is that average financial 
ratios are inconsistent throughout time, as performance will vary throughout time with economic 
conditions and other factors.  
                                                          
14
 Note that variables 9 (M/B) and 10 (P/E) will always be measured in the final year of pre sample data, regardless 
of whether the model is of the combined form or of the single form. This is consistent with the methodology of 
Walter (1994) who utilised the average of two years or pre-sample financial ratios.  
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Table Two – Explanation of the Prediction Sample  
Prediction Model 
Description  
Prediction Sample 
Financial Data 
Target/Non-target 
Designation Period  Industry Adjustment  
Single Raw 2004 2005 and 2006 No 
Single Adjusted 2004 2005 and 2006 Yes  
Combined Raw Average (2003, 2004) 2005 and 2006 No  
Combined Adjusted  Average (2003, 2004) 2005 and 2006 Yes  
 
 
The second sample will be used to assess the ex-ante predictive accuracy of the four models 
estimated from the estimation sample, and will subsequently referred to as the prediction sample. 
The models estimated within the estimation sample will be applied to classify firms in the 
prediction period presented in Table Two. The prediction sample can be explained in an identical 
manner to the estimation sample. The only difference between the prediction sample and the 
estimation sample is that measurement and designation of firms as targets and non-targets is 
moved two years forward. The single models utilise only 2004 financial data, whilst the 
combined models utilise the average of 2003 and 2004 financial data. Firms are classified as 
targets and non-targets using calendar years 2005 and 2006 for all models.  
 
Note that for all models the classification period for targets and non-targets refers to calendar 
years, whilst the measurement of financial data refers to financial years. This lag between 
measurement and classification is to allow the timely release of financial data into the public 
arena and to allow those companies whose balance dates fall after 30
th
 June to report their 
financials. Measurement of financial data before the designation of firms as targets and non-
targets allows us to predict in a true ex-ante fashion. This is because we only use financial 
variables from a period before prediction of targets and non-targets, which allows us to invest in 
the predictions of the model.  
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For the estimation of the model, we propose a technique known as state-based sampling in 
conjunction with Maximum Likelihood estimation available through SAS
15
. This is achieved by 
including all target firms in the estimation sample, along with an equal number of randomly 
selected non-target firms for the same period. Allison (2006) proposes that the use of such state-
based sampling, where the dependent variable states are unequally distributed in the population, 
increases the precision of the estimated parameters (reduces the standard error of the estimated 
parameters). Unequally distributed states are an evident problem in this study, as less than 7 
percent (11 percent) of firms actually become targets in the estimation (prediction) samples. 
Targets from the estimation sample will be paired with a random sample of non-target firms 
from the same period. Although Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) provide evidence that this 
method biases the estimated intercept term, model classifications remain accurate as estimated 
acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets are equally biased.  
 
3.4 Advantages of Sample and Model Construction  
The sampling methodology explained in Section 3.3 has a number of obvious differences to that 
commonly employed in the takeover prediction literature. Firstly, researchers such as Barnes 
(1990, 1999) match targets and non-targets on the basis of size and/or industry participation, 
creating an estimation sample which is essentially non-random. Although this creates an 
unbiased and accurate estimation of the theorised model, this is generally applied to a prediction 
sample where classification outcomes are not known and targets cannot be matched to non-
                                                          
15
 SAS is extremely useful for the purposes of logistic regression as it allows the estimation of models and prediction 
within future sample periods. It also allows the estimation of multinomial models and provides many extremely 
valuable model options, which are essential for the methodologies explained in this section of the thesis.  
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targets. For this reason, randomly selected non-target firms will be used for the state-based 
estimation sample.  
 
Secondly, researchers such as Powell (2001) and Palepu (1986) randomly assign years of 
measurement for non-target variables. Although industry adjustment goes some way to improve 
comparability across time periods, this adjustment is not perfect, and may cause biases and 
inconsistencies in the estimated model. This thesis will make all measurements for target and 
non-target firms over identical periods.  
 
Thirdly, researchers such as Powell (2001) and Palepu (1986) utilise estimation samples which 
are some 10 years in length. Powell himself, and others such as Walter (1994), have provided 
significant evidence that the motivations for takeover are highly unstable throughout time. 
Motivations for takeover estimated from such long samples may not be applicable to a future 
prediction sample. A short two year estimation sample will be used to predict in a short two year 
prediction period to maximise the potential predictive accuracy of the model.  
 
Fourthly, many studies do not account for survivorship bias, which is particularly prevalent in 
financial ratios constructed from Datastream as only live firms are included in the construction of 
industry averages. Non-inclusion of dead firms may create an upward bias in estimated industry 
averages, which could result in skewness across industries and lead to inaccurate predictions. 
Only Powell (2001) has explicitly accounted for this by reconstructing the full sample of listed 
firms for measurement years by including dead firms. This study will account for potential 
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survivorship biases by reconstructing the industry averages for the estimation and prediction 
samples on the basis of all live firms with available accounting data.  
 
3.5 Accurate Calculation of Industry Relative Ratios 
As suggested, most researchers attempting to predict takeover targets since the paper of Palepu 
(1986) have utilised a common form of industry relative ratios, which are generally calculated by 
scaling the firms’ financial ratio by the industry average as shown by Equation 4.  
 
  [4] 
 
 
 
 
 
Under this procedure all financial ratios are standardised to one, with industry relative ratios 
above one indicating outperformance of the industry and those below indicating 
underperformance of the industry for a ratio such as ROA or ROE. But a problem is encountered 
when the industry average is a negative value. In this case, those firms which underperform the 
industry average are also given industry relative ratios which are greater than one, as a large 
negative number will be divided by a smaller negative number. A firm which outperforms a 
negative industry average but retains a negative ratio will be assigned a variable less than one, 
which suggests underperformance. The existence of some industries with negative industry 
averages and some with positive ones exacerbates the problem, resulting in meaningless 
financial ratios. Such problems may have contributed to the inability of the Barnes (1999) model 
to predict any takeover targets at all. 
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  [5] 
 
 
Examination of the variables constructed from Section 3.1 indicates that many industries have 
negative averages, whilst some have positive averages. We propose the use of a new calculation 
which was implemented for our two models which utilised industry adjustment. Equation 5 
utilises the difference between the individual firm’s ratio and the industry average ratio, which is 
divided by the absolute value of the industry average ratio. This standardises all financial ratios 
to an industry average of 0 whilst correcting problems relating to the sign of the ratio by taking 
the absolute value. Using a variable such as ROA, underperformance of the industry results in an 
industry relative ratio which is less than zero, whilst outperformance of the industry results in an 
industry relative ratio which is greater than zero. Even if some industries have negative averages, 
and some have positive averages, this ratio will still be meaningful. Note that all industry 
adjustments are made on the basis of the old ASX coding system, rather than the new GICS 
codes, as this system provides a more specific differentiation between industries with 24 industry 
codes. Industry averages in this thesis will be calculated on an equally-weighted basis, consistent 
with the bulk of the takeover prediction literature. Researchers such as Powell (2001) have used 
different approaches, using value-weighted calculations. Variables in both models which utilised 
industry adjustment were calculated according to this methodology, resulting in improved 
explanatory power and markedly different parameter estimates.  
 
3.6 Data Requirements 
To construct the financial variables required for the construction of the logit model, accounting 
data was required for all ASX listed companies for the financial years of 2001 to 2004. This 
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information was sourced from the AspectHuntley database, which provided us with standardised 
access to financial statement data for all ASX listed companies between 1995 and 2004. Such a 
wide sample was a requirement for the construction of industry relative ratios, which were used 
in the construction of the adjusted models. To construct the M/B (9) and P/E (10) variables, stock 
prices from the relevant balance dates were required for all of these listed companies. These were 
sourced from the AspectHuntley online database, the SIRCA Core Price Data Set, and Yahoo! 
Finance as a last resort. Additionally, lists of takeover bids and their announcement dates were 
required for the construction of the dependent variables from 2003 to 2006. These were sourced 
from AspectHuntley and Connect 4.  
 
Additionally, target statements were required for all targets to ascertain whether the bid was 
hostile or friendly. This was required for the multinomial models to be explained in Section 3.14. 
Stock price data was also required for the construction of portfolios to be explained in Section 
3.12. This comprised daily price data for these stocks for the calendar years 2004, 2005 and 
2006. This data was sourced from the AspectHuntley online database, whilst the required 
ASX200 index levels were sourced from Yahoo! Finance. Data concerning the interest rate for 
90 Day Bank Accepted Bills was collected from the RBA website for the same period.  
 
3.7 Data Limitations and Filtering Procedures 
Note that for the purposes of our analysis four industries were eliminated, as measurements of 
financial performance in these industries are dissimilar to traditional measurements of 
profitability and performance in other industries. These included Banks and Finance (16), 
Insurance (17), Investment and Financial Services (19), and Property Trusts (20). This resulted in 
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20 of 24 industries being available for the final four models.  Problems with the calculation of 
three variables were encountered, which led us to eliminate these from the model. Due to the 
insufficient data regarding operating revenue and interest expense, variables 3, 11 and 18 were 
eliminated as their calculation resulted in many undefined variable observations. Some firms 
were missing balance date prices, negating the calculation of the M/B (9) and P/E (10) variables. 
Additionally, some firms were missing statement lines for EBIT and NPAT, although we 
reconstructed many of these from other statement lines in the database. A filtering process was 
then undertaken to remove any firm observations which did not have complete variables, as 
application of the model to these firm observations would cause estimated acquisition 
probabilities for these firms to be biased. This process, and the elimination of the four 
problematic industries, resulted in the initial sample of approximately 1500 firms being reduced 
to estimation and prediction samples which held 1060 and 1054 firms respectively. This is 
adequately representative of all ASX listed firms, and compares favourably to the largest study 
of Palepu (1986) which utilised 1087 firms for similar classifications.  
 
Some preliminary outlier elimination was also conducted. Powell (1997) eliminated all firms 
with any financial ratios which exceeded three standard deviations of their mean. Powell (2001) 
utilised a similar technique, but instead of eliminating these outlier variables, he winsorized them 
to lie within three standard deviations of their means. We undertook a much more simple 
procedure, as it may be these outliers which allow us to achieve accurate classifications of targets 
and non-targets. Firms were only eliminated if one or more of their financial ratios exceeded 
three standard deviations of the mean, and if this was obviously impacting on the industry 
average financial ratio. This resulted in a different number of observations for the four different 
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models in both the estimation and prediction samples. Differences in sample sizes between 
models also resulted from different data availabilities.  
 
3.8 Multicollinearity Elimination Process 
It has been widely acknowledged within the takeover and bankruptcy prediction literature that 
the financial variables used to proxy for the motivational hypotheses are highly collinear 
(Barnes, 1999). This results from the use of common denominators such as net assets, total 
assets, and shareholders equity. As in the Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM), 
multicollinearity causes a number of problems for estimated models. Parameters are inefficiently 
estimated, leading to high standard errors and imprecise estimators, and to many insignificant 
variables in a model which may have high explanatory power. Stevens (1973) overcame these 
problems by using a factor analysis within his discriminant model to create uncorrelated factors. 
Palepu (1986), Walter (1994), and Powell (2001) utilised a different technique within their logit 
models, selecting only one variable for each of the hypothesised motivations for takeover. 
Although effective from a multicollinearity perspective, this may have also caused another 
problem known as the omission of relevant explanatory variables. Econometricians such as 
Gujarati (2003) suggest that this violates the unbiased and consistent nature of estimated 
coefficients. Such problems may have been a contributing factor to the poor predictive 
accuracies reported in these studies.  
 
This thesis will not employ this multicollinearity elimination methodology, but will attempt to 
eliminate multicollinearity from the variable list in Section 3.1 to create an appropriately 
specified model. All four models will first be estimated with all of the explanatory variables to 
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examine whether any problems are evident and to compare the explanatory power of models. 
Two different procedures will be utilised to examine for the presence of multicollinearity. The 
first procedure available in SAS is the calculation of the correlation matrix for all explanatory 
variables. The problem with this procedure is that it only examines first order correlations 
between two explanatory variables. Because multicollinearity may be caused by higher order 
correlations, examination of correlations alone may lead to an ineffective elimination of 
multicollinearity. SAS will be used to calculate Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factors, which 
are based on  from a regression of one of the individual explanatory variables on all other 
explanatory variables in the model. A variable will be deemed as problematic and eliminated if 
its correlation coefficient with another variable exceeds 0.8 or if its Variance Inflation Factor 
exceeds a value of 10.  
 
3.9 Examination of Motivational Hypotheses  
The next step after the elimination of multicollinearity is to examine the significant motivations 
for takeovers. This will be firstly achieved with a univariate comparison of means between target 
and non-target firms using a t-test methodology. This is equivalent to the use of a one-way 
Analysis-of-Variance (ANOVA) table, which is also equivalent to some forms of the CLRM. As 
logistic regression also has links to linear regression, any significant differences should be 
indicative of the significant parameters from the subsequent logit estimation. A positive 
(negative) and significant t value indicates that the mean financial ratio of targets is statistically 
greater (smaller) than the mean financial ratio for non-targets at the designated level of 
significance.  
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H0: Means are not statistically different ( ) 
H1: Means are statistically different ( ) 
 
  [6] 
 
 
  [7] 
 
 
The logit models will be estimated after this univariate comparison. A backward stepwise 
regression will be utilised to retain only those variables which are significant in explaining 
acquisition likelihood across all four models estimated. On the basis of the univariate and 
stepwise regression results, an examination of the hypothesised motivations for takeover in the 
Australian context will be made and compared to results from the extant literature. Note that 
although the backward stepwise model is useful for examination of motivational hypotheses, the 
full complement of variables will be included for the purposes of prediction. This is based on the 
contention of researchers such as Barnes (1999) that complex relationships between explanatory 
variables may allow us to differentiate between target and non-target firms at a level which 
cannot be achieved with only significant discriminatory variables.  
 
3.10 Classification and Alternative Optimal Cutoff Calculations 
When we implement the ordinary linear regression model for prediction, the explanatory 
variables for future periods are used as inputs into the model, which results in a predicted value 
for the dependent variable. This is simple, as the predicted value simply forms the prediction. In 
the case of the logit model, the output of a prediction based on the input of explanatory variables 
is a predicted probability of acquisition estimated according to Equation 2. But the outcome that 
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we want is a prediction of whether the firm will or will not become a target during the future 
period. Two methodologies, known as optimal cutoff calculations, have been proposed to 
accurately classify these probabilities as predicted targets and non-targets. Firms with predicted 
probabilities of acquisition above these cutoffs are classified as predicted targets and those with 
predicted probabilities of acquisition below these cutoffs are classified as predicted non-targets.  
 
Table Three – Classification and Prediction Outcome Matrix 
 Predicted Outcome  
Actual Outcome Non-Target (0) Target (1) Total 
Non-Target (0) A00 A01 (Type II Error) TA0 
Target (1) A10 (Type I Error) A11 TA1 
Total TP0 TP1 T 
 
 
 
3.10.1 Minimisation of Total Error Probabilities (Palepu, 1986)  
To understand the calculation of the optimal cutoff probability, an understanding of Type I and 
Type II errors must first be reached. A Type I error occurs when a firm is predicted to become a 
takeover target and does not (outcome A01 in Table Three), whilst a Type II error occurs when a 
firm is predicted not to become a target but actually becomes a target (outcome A10). The 
methodology of Palepu (1986) assumes that the cost of these two types of errors is identical to an 
investor in the predicted targets of the model. To calculate the optimal cutoff probability in this 
case, we simply use a histogram to plot the frequencies of estimated probabilities of acquisition 
for targets and non-targets separately on the same graph as demonstrated by Figure One. The 
optimal cutoff probability which minimises the total probabilities of these errors occurs at the 
intersection of these two conditional distributions – where the two conditional marginal densities 
are equal. Such a methodology allows for equal occurrences of Type I and Type II errors.  
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Figure One – Graph of proposed Alternative Cutoff Calculations 
 
 
 
 
3.10.2 Minimisation of Total Error Costs (Barnes, 1999)  
The problem with the methodology of Palepu (1986) is that it assumes that the costs of the two 
types of errors are identical. Particularly in bankruptcy prediction, researchers such as Heish 
(1993) have concluded that the costs of these types of errors are not identical. If the objective of 
prediction is returns maximisation from investment in predicted targets, the cost of investing in 
the equity of a firm which doesn’t become a takeover target (Type II error) is greater than the 
cost of not investing in the equity of a firm that becomes a takeover target (Type I error) as we 
do not invest in predicted non-targets. To maximise returns, Barnes (1999) suggests that we must 
maximise the concentration ratio of Powell (2001) – the number of actual targets in the portfolio 
of predicted targets (A11 to TP1 in Table Three). This minimises the occurrence of Type II errors, 
as demonstrated by Figure One, as no actual non-target firms are classified as targets. But note 
that this dramatically increases the occurrence of the non-costly Type I error (A10). This optimal 
cutoff calculation is based on the rationale that targets should earn significantly positive 
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abnormal returns, and to maximise returns we must maximise the concentration of actual targets 
in the portfolio of predicted targets. To calculate the optimal cutoff probability for this method, 
we manually change the cutoff probability from 0 to 1 by an increment of 0.025. For each cutoff, 
we calculate the concentration ratio. The optimal cutoff is chosen which maximises the 
concentration ratio. This methodology is also similar to that of Powell (2001). Note that 
references to accuracy from this point will be referring to the concentration ratio rather than the 
proportion of targets accurately predicted, as this theoretically maximises returns.  
 
3.10.3 Optimal Cutoff Calculation Methodology 
Note that to calculate the optimal cutoff probability accurately for the prediction sample; we 
require knowledge of the actual outcomes for the period. As the purpose of this paper is to 
implement the model in such a way which replicates the problem faced by a practitioner, we are 
unable to utilise the actual outcomes of bid or no bid in the prediction period to calculate the 
optimal cutoff. We must use a cutoff point estimated from the estimation sample. Many 
researchers cited in this paper (such as Walter, 1994) use a cutoff point derived from the 
prediction period, which does not indicate the true predictive accuracy of the model implemented 
by a practitioner for prediction. It most likely inflates the accuracies reported in these studies. On 
the basis of these cutoff probabilities, a comparison will be made concerning their accuracies to 
conclude whether the Barnes (1999) methodology improves classification accuracy in the 
estimation and prediction samples relative to the Palepu (1986) methodology. If the parameters 
describing the distributions of estimated acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets 
individually are stable over time, then the Barnes (1999) methodology should improve predictive 
accuracy for all models within the prediction sample. If stability is not maintained, then the 
48 | P a g e  
 
results may not indicate superiority of this methodology. Such instability is confirmed by the 
results of Powell (2001) who demonstrates that the optimal cutoff derived from an estimation 
sample does not maximise the concentration ratio in a predictive sample.  
 
3.11 Assessing the Predictive Accuracy of the Logit Model  
SAS provides a number of statistics which allow us to assess the explanatory power of our 
estimated models. The likelihood ratio and likelihood score are both identical to the F test in a 
linear regression, and examine whether all coefficients are equal to zero. Jennings (1986) 
proposes that the likelihood score is more appropriate in small samples, which is relevant to this 
study given that we are not estimating with an entire sample but a smaller state-based sample. 
Additionally, a traditional R-squared statistic and a Maximum Rescaled R-square statistic can be 
used to estimate predictive power of the models. The Maximum Rescaled version accounts for 
the fact that a perfect fit is not available in a dichotomous choice model by rescaling with a value 
less than 100 percent. But the problem with these statistics is that they do not examine the true 
classification accuracy of such models, which is a major objective of this thesis. Walter (1994), 
Zanakis and Zopounidis (1997), and Barnes (1999) utilised an ingenious technique which 
assesses whether predictions of the model are significantly greater than a chance selection
16
. Our 
model will predict a number of actual targets and non-targets with errors in both predictions. We 
must be able to compare these accuracies to some benchmark, such as a chance selection. The 
Proportional Chance Criterion and the Maximum Chance Criterion were developed by Morrison 
(1969) to compare the predictions of discriminant models to chance. They are applicable in this 
situation as we face a similar discrete choice problem.  
                                                          
16
 If we were to predict a portfolio of targets with chance accuracy, we would expect an occurrence of targets in this 
portfolio equal to their frequency of occurrence in the population of listed firms.  
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3.11.1 Proportional Chance Criterion  
To assess the predictive power and classification abilities of the estimated models, a proportional 
chance criterion statistic can be calculated to compare the models predictive accuracy to that 
expected under chance. This statistic assesses whether the overall classifications of the model are 
better than that expected under chance, as the statistic is based on the correct classification of 
targets and non-targets jointly. Although this does not indicate the source of the classification 
accuracy of the model, that is whether the model accurately predicts either targets or non-targets 
individually, it is an important statistic with which to assess alternative models.  
 
H0: P ≤ Chance (Model is unable to classify targets and non-targets jointly better than chance) 
H1: P > Chance (Model is able to classify targets and non-targets jointly better than chance) 
 
  [8] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The simple Z calculation in Equation 8 tests the hypothesis that the accuracy of the model is 
worse than or equal to chance against the alternative hypothesis that the accuracy of the model is 
greater than chance. Note that under a chance selection, we would select a proportion of targets 
and non-targets equal to their occurrence in the population under consideration. If the calculated 
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Z statistic in Equation 8 is significant, we are able to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that 
the model can classify target and non-target firms jointly better than expected under chance.  
 
3.11.2 Maximum Chance Criterion  
Although the above proportional chance criterion statistic may indicate that the model can 
classify firms better than chance, it does not indicate the specific source of this accuracy, that is 
whether the model is accurately classifying target or non-target firms individually. Based on a 
similar Z statistic calculation and hypotheses, a significant value for the Maximum Chance 
Criterion statistic indicates that the model has power significantly greater than chance in 
classifying target or not target firms individually, whichever is the accuracy of interest.  
 
H0: P ≤ Chance (Model is unable to classify targets/non-targets individually better than chance) 
H1: P > Chance (Model is able to classify targets/non-targets individually better than chance) 
 
  [9] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the calculated Z statistic in Equation 9 is significant, we can conclude that the prediction of 
targets/non-targets individually is greater than chance. To assess the classification accuracy of 
the models in both the estimation and prediction samples, these two statistics will be utilised to 
compare the accuracies of competing models and also compare the accuracies of our models to 
those in the extant literature. Note that our focus is on the maximum chance criterion for targets, 
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as under the reasoning of Barnes (1999) the accurate prediction of targets is the main objective of 
the model, rather than the accurate prediction of target and non-target firms. This is because the 
accurate prediction of targets should maximise the concentration ratio and also the returns from 
an investment in the portfolio of predicted targets (Powell, 2001).  
 
3.12 Assessing Profitability of Common Predictions 
Although the Proportional and Maximum Chance Criterions provide us with a statistical 
assessment of the predictive accuracies of our models, we require an economic quantification of 
the potential investment returns from the portfolio of predicted targets. Palepu (1986) contends 
that we may be able to predict with high accuracies, but that the probability of takeover may 
already be impounded into the price of a stock, negating the ability to earn significant abnormal 
returns from an investment in predicted targets. Palepu (1986), Walter (1994), Wansley et al 
(1983) and Powell (2001) all analysed returns from an investment in an equally weighted 
portfolio of predicted targets. Only Wansley et al (1983) was able to provide evidence of the 
ability to earn significantly positive abnormal returns, but this was based on the flawed state-
based prediction sample explained in Section 1.1. The conclusion to be drawn from these studies 
is that significant positive abnormal returns cannot be made from an investment in predicted 
targets of the models. Also, the portfolios of predicted targets in these studies were 
unrealistically large. Walter predicted 91 firms to become targets, Palepu predicted 625, and 
Powell predicted 96. A sensible practitioner would limit their investment to a portfolio of 10 to 
15 stocks as the transactions costs associated with a portfolio larger than this would erode any 
potential profit opportunity. To overcome this problem, only the commonly predicted targets 
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across all models were retained. This also served the purpose of increasing the concentration of 
actual targets in the portfolio of predicted targets.  
 
The equally weighted portfolio approach was applied to these commonly predicted targets rather 
than the predictions of a single model, and the portfolio was held for the entire prediction period 
of 2005 and 2006. Note that this approach has one severe limitation, being that a practitioner 
with such information is unlikely to simply take a long position in these stocks. They are more 
likely to take a leveraged position through options. Even so, this approach provides a similar 
abnormal return measurement to those employed in the extant literature so that accurate 
comparisons can be drawn.  
 
  [10] 
 
  [11] 
 
The benchmark return used for risk adjustment was the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
demonstrated in Equation 10. This differs from the methodologies of Walter (1994) and Palepu 
(1986), who utilised the market model and decile portfolios respectively for benchmark returns. 
The relevant parameters for the calculation of benchmark returns were estimated from 252 
trading days in the 2004 calendar year according to Equation 11. Note that the market return was 
taken to be the return on the ASX 200 Index, whilst the risk free return was taken to be the 
interest rate on 90 Day Bank Accepted Bills. 
 
  [12] 
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To calculate the abnormal return for each of the stocks during the prediction period, the expected 
return calculated according to the estimated CAPM of Equation 11 is taken from the actual 
return as demonstrated by Equation 12.  
 
  [13] 
 
  [14] 
 
The idea of the equally weighted portfolio approach is to have an equal weight in each predicted 
target. To calculate the Average Abnormal Return (AAR) from such a portfolio, we simply take 
the average of each stocks abnormal return according to Equation 13. Note that the number of 
stocks in this portfolio (n) changes during the prediction period as successfully acquired firms 
are delisted. To calculate the statistic of interest, the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
(CAAR) for the prediction period, we simply sum the AAR of the portfolio over the days which 
the portfolio is active according to Equation 14. To assess the significance of this outcome, we 
require an appropriate test statistic. Walter (1994) proposed the relatively simple t statistic 
calculation presented in Equation 15, which will be utilised by this study
17
.  
 
H0: CAAR is not significantly different from zero 
H1: CAAR is significantly different from zero 
 
  [15] 
 
 
                                                          
17
 The standard error in this equation is the estimated standard error from the 2004 calendar year, and 504 represents 
the number of trading days over which significance is being assessed.  
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Fama (1998) highlights an obvious problem with this test statistic, as abnormal returns may be 
correlated across stocks due to common event waves, and the standard error of the portfolio will 
change with the construction of the portfolio (heteroskedasticity).  
 
  [16] 
 
  [17] 
 
 
 
Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974) proposed that the abnormal return on the equally weighted 
portfolio be divided by an estimate of the standard deviation of that portfolio on a daily basis, 
creating what has become known as a Standardised Abnormal Return (SAR) of Equation 16. 
Palepu (1986) utilised this technique within his takeover prediction study as a result of the 
influential study of Brown and Warner (1985) whose techniques are still utilised today for the 
assessment of abnormal returns on a daily basis. The test statistic in Equation 17 accounts for the 
potential problems highlighted by the above researchers, and accumulates the SAR for the period 
over which the significance of the CAAR is being assessed. By not enacting this procedure, our 
estimated t statistic may be exaggerated, which may lead to inaccurate inferences being made 
because as the null hypothesis of no significant CAAR would be more readily rejected.   
 
A number of robustness checks will be undertaken to ensure that any abnormal return to our 
portfolio is consistent. A positive return may be driven by a chance selection of non-target firms 
in the portfolio of predicted targets which simply outperform the market, which we believe is 
driving the results of Powell (2004). In this case, a significant CAAR would be attributable to 
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chance rather than accuracy of the model, as sometimes we may select highly performing non-
target stocks but in other times we might select poorly performing non-target stocks. But if the 
returns are driven by the predicted targets which actually become targets, then we can be certain 
that any positive CAAR is a result of the accuracy of the model rather than a chance selection.  
 
3.13 Justification of CAR Methodology for Return Metric 
Recently, researchers such as Lyon and Barber (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) have 
proposed the use of Buy and Hold Returns (BHAR’s) rather than CAR’s for the measurement of 
abnormal performance. They propose that in volatile markets, CAR’s are positively biased 
predictors of BAHR’s, which may lead to inaccurate statistical inferences being drawn, with the 
use of asset pricing models leading to problematic biases in such studies. Fama (1998) has 
refuted this evidence. He cites evidence of the skewness issues created by BAHR’s as they 
compound short period returns and their inability to overcome cross-correlation problems which 
have been accounted for within the SAR methodology. Our contention is that the CAAR 
methodology, coupled with the appropriate SAR methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) 
which accounts for potential heteroskedasticity and cross-correlation, is the most appropriate 
statistic to assess abnormal returns on a daily basis. And even though the CAPM has come under 
some recent scrutiny, researchers such as Fama (1998) still believe that calculated abnormal 
returns are extremely accurate using such a benchmark return.  
 
3.14 Multinomial Logit Models – Methodology and Justification  
The methodology to this point of the thesis has focused on the binomial model which aggregates 
all types of targets into a single category. This is consistent with the bulk of the extant literature. 
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Allison (2006) and Powell (2004) suggest that the aggregation of multinomial categories into a 
binomial model can lead to a misspecified model in which parameter estimates are 
uninterpretable as the groups of interest are not clearly defined. On the basis of this evidence, an 
attempt will be made to differentiate between certain categories of targets. The first 
differentiation will be between targets of successful and unsuccessful takeover bids
18
. Most 
researchers do not indicate whether their binomial models include all successful and 
unsuccessful takeovers. Barnes (1999) denominates both successful and unsuccessful takeover 
targets as targets in his binomial model, but Powell (2001) denominates only targets of 
successful takeovers as targets. Our discrimination is based on a basic economic argument rather 
than empirical evidence which documenting differences between these two groups of targets. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) document no significant abnormal returns for shareholders of target 
firms where the bid fails, contrasting significant abnormal returns of 20 percent to 30 percent in 
the case of successful takeovers. This is confirmed by Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983), who 
document that all positive abnormal returns made around the bid announcement dissipate if the 
bid fails and another bid is not expected. Based on this reasoning, if one is able to differentiate 
between targets of successful and unsuccessful takeovers, one should be able to utilise the 
multinomial model to predict targets of successful takeovers only. This should theoretically lead 
to increased abnormal returns from portfolio investment.  
 
                                                          
18
 If a target receives more than a single bid during the sample period, then the takeover will be considered 
successful if one of the bids is successful. Otherwise the bid will be classified as unsuccessful. Note that success as 
defined by this thesis requires that the bidder has achieved enough acceptances to assure compulsory acquisition of 
remaining shares.  
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The second differentiation will be made between targets of hostile and friendly takeovers
19
. This 
is based on both the empirical evidence of differential characteristics between these groups of 
targets, and a similar economic justification. Morck Shleifer and Vishny (1988) provide general 
evidence that significant differences in motivations exist between hostile (disciplinary) and 
friendly (synergistic) takeovers. These differences are confirmed by the multinomial models of 
Powell (1997, 2004), providing significant evidence that the binomial model is misspecified. 
Economically, Jensen and Ruback (1983) provide evidence that abnormal returns to shareholders 
of targets of hostile takeovers are 10 percent larger than those to shareholders of friendly 
takeovers (30 percent versus 20 percent abnormal announcement period returns). Franks and 
Harris (1989) confirm this evidence, but believe that this differential may be larger at some 14 
percent. Based on this reasoning, we should be able to use the multinomial model to predict 
targets of hostile acquisitions only. This should theoretically increase the abnormal returns from 
a portfolio investment as in the case of the prediction of successful targets only.  
 
Multinomial logit models require the estimation of K-1 equations, essentially similar to the 
binomial model presented in Equation 1, where K represents the number of categories being 
modelled. Each multinomial model will therefore require the estimation of two equations, which 
indicate the probability of becoming successful or unsuccessful takeover targets, or hostile or 
friendly takeover targets. A third equation is able to be estimated in multinomial models to 
examine whether any significant differences exist between types of takeover targets. These will 
be utilised to examine whether any significant differences exist between the characteristics of 
                                                          
19
 Takeovers will be considered to be hostile in nature if the independent target report contains a director’s 
recommendation to reject the proposed bid. In the case that a number of bids are launched during the sample period, 
a firm will be classified as a hostile takeover target if at least one of the bids is rejected by target management.  
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these types of target firms to determine whether the binomial model is misspecified. In the case 
that the binomial model is misspecified, our estimated parameters will need to be reinterpreted in 
the context of the multinomial model. Robustness checks will also be made using the univariate 
comparison of means explained in Section 3.9, which should be indicative of the estimated 
parameters of the multinomial model. Classification within the estimation and prediction samples 
will also be extended to classification of successful and hostile takeovers individually, as the 
above economic reasoning suggests that investment in these types of takeover targets should 
increase abnormal returns from a portfolio investment. These classification results will be 
compared to those of the binomial model to examine whether any benefit exists from the 
application of the multinomial model to single out these categories.  
 
3.15 Methodological Hypotheses  
This methodological section of this thesis has provided theoretical evidence suggesting that a 
number of methodological improvements will improve the predictive accuracy of the model. 
Platt and Platt (1990) provided evidence that the use of industry relative ratios improved 
predictive accuracy within bankruptcy prediction studies, but this has not been empirically 
confirmed within the takeover prediction literature. Additionally, Barnes (1999) was unable to 
demonstrate that his derivation of the optimal cutoff point resulted in increases in predictive 
accuracy. And although the study of Walter (1994) indicated that the combination of two years 
of pre-sample financial data improved predictive accuracy, no direct comparisons were made. 
Also, Powell (2004) provided weak evidence that the use of multinomial logit models to predict 
hostile takeover targets individually increased the accuracy of the model in predicting these 
events. On the basis of these arguments, four hypotheses relating to methodological 
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improvements are proposed. These will be tested through a comparison of the predictive 
accuracies of the four proposed models from Tables One and Two.  
 
H9: Use of the average of two years of pre-sample financial data will result in an improvement in 
predictive accuracy over the use of only a single years’ pre-sample financial data.  
 
H10: Use of industry relative ratios will result in an increase in predictive accuracy over models 
which employ raw financial ratios.  
 
H11: Use of the Barnes (1999) derived cutoff point will result in an increase in predictive 
accuracy over the use of the Palepu (1986) derived cutoff point.  
 
H12: Use of multinomial logit models for the prediction of successful and hostile takeover targets 
individually will result in improved accuracies for prediction of these events compared to those 
of the binomial model.  
 
4. Results  
4.1 Initial Estimation  
Table Four presents the results of the initial estimation of all four models, which was undertaken 
to examine for the presence of multicollinearity and to compare the explanatory power of 
competing models. This was based on a final state-based estimation sample of 125 firms, 
consisting of 62 targets and 63 non-targets.  
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Table Four – Initial Estimation of all models 
 
Single Raw 
Model 
Single Adjusted 
Model 
Combined Raw 
Model 
Combined 
Adjusted Model 
Variables Est 
Prob > 
Chi Sq Est 
Prob > 
Chi Sq Est 
Prob > 
Chi Sq Est 
Prob > 
Chi Sq 
Intercept -14.61 (<0.01) -0.19 (0.65) -15.64 (<0.01) -0.06 (0.89) 
1 – ROA 2.14 (0.41) -0.11 (0.49) 4.30 (0.13) 0.19 (0.42) 
2 – ROE -6.55 (0.16) 0.04 (0.32) -6.16 (0.11) 0.02 (0.87) 
4 – EBIT/SE 6.96 (0.17) 0.01 (0.70) 5.68 (0.13) -0.01 (0.92) 
5 – FCF/TA 3.91 (0.25) -0.05 (0.60) 2.92 (0.31) 0.03 (0.80) 
6 – DIV/SE 2.97 (0.74) 0.18 (0.46) -2.67 (0.74) 0.18 (0.44) 
7 – EBIT GWTH 0.00 (0.98) -0.02 (0.58) 0.08 (0.47) -0.02 (0.60) 
8 – ACTIVITY -0.26 (0.54) -0.70 (0.05) -0.19 (0.61) -0.52 (0.15) 
9 – M/B -0.02 (0.32) 0.19 (0.31) -0.01 (0.53) 0.08 (0.68) 
10 – P/E 2.00 (0.13) 0.02 (0.25) 0.59 (0.48) 0.03 (0.36) 
12 – CAPEX/TA 4.00 (0.46) 0.32 (0.16) 6.35 (0.22) 0.67 (0.02) 
13 – CURRENT 0.07 (0.87) 0.35 (0.71) -0.41 (0.58) 1.36 (0.35) 
14 – (CA-CL)/TA -3.64 (0.05) -0.02 (0.68) -2.14 (0.15) -0.21 (0.07) 
15 – QCK ASSETS -0.01 (0.98) 0.01 (0.99) 0.52 (0.48) -0.13 (0.92) 
16 – PAYOUT -4.07 (<0.01) -0.26 (0.09) -2.75 (0.01) -0.51 (0.04) 
17 – NET GEAR -0.24 (0.42) -0.14 (0.28) -1.06 (0.04) -0.11 (0.18) 
19 – TL/TA -2.94 (0.16) -0.17 (0.78) -1.21 (0.44) -1.08 (0.12) 
20 – LT DEBT/TA -1.41 (0.62) -0.09 (0.63) -0.43 (0.86) -0.07 (0.78) 
21 – INDUSTRY -0.10 (0.79) -0.31 (0.31) -0.02 (0.94) -0.52 (0.18) 
22 – Ln (TA) 0.95 (<0.01) 12.53 (<0.01) 0.95 (<0.01) 15.88 (<0.01) 
23 – NET ASSETS 0.00 (0.01) -0.22 (0.11) 0.00 (0.01) -0.27 (0.04) 
              
 
  
Model Statistics             
 
  
Likelihood Ratio 79.90 (<.0001) 54.01 (<.0001) 74.92 (<.0001) 67.88 (<.0001) 
Likelihood Score 53.42 (<.0001) 41.70 (0.003) 54.19 (<.0001) 51.86 (<.0001) 
R-Square 0.47   0.35   0.45   0.42   
Max Rescaled  
R-Square 0.63   0.47   0.60   0.56   
Note: Estimated parameters in bold type represent those variables which are significant in explaining 
acquisition likelihood at the 10 percent level. A Chi-square statistic is used to assess the significance of 
each variable, which is the most appropriate test statistic for logistic regressions.  
 
Note that interpretation of estimated coefficients in the case of the logit model is not identical to 
parameter interpretation in the linear regression model. In the CLRM, a one unit change in the 
explanatory variable corresponds to an x unit change in the dependent variable, x representing 
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the estimated coefficient. But in the logit model, a one unit change in the explanatory variable 
corresponds to an x unit change in the log odds of event probability, which in the case of this 
thesis is acquisition probability. The non-linear relationship between acquisition probability and 
the explanatory variables means that we cannot interpret the exact impact of a change in an 
explanatory variable on acquisition probability without the use of a reference point, as 
demonstrated by the explanation of Equation 3 in Section 3.2. Even so, the sign and significance 
of estimated parameters can be interpreted in an identical manner to the CLRM.  
 
Examination of Table Four indicates some interesting preliminary results. The likelihood and R-
squared statistics seem to suggest that the models which utilise a single year of pre-sample 
financial data have a higher level of explanatory power and predictive accuracy than those 
models which utilise an average of two years of pre-sample financial data. This contradicts 
Hypothesis 9 of this thesis. These statistics also suggest that the models which utilise the 
unadjusted (raw) financial ratios have a higher level of explanatory power and predictive 
accuracy than those models which utilise adjusted financial ratios. This contradicts Hypothesis 
10 of this thesis. Additionally, there is no clear consensus as to the significant motivations for 
takeovers across the estimated models, even though the models have significant explanatory 
power beyond the 1 percent level. This is an obvious sign of multicollinearity, as standard errors 
will be inflated leading to inefficient parameter estimates which are also shown to be 
insignificant. Even so, all models suggest a positive relationship between variable 22 (Ln (TA)) 
and acquisition likelihood. This relationship contradicts the size hypothesis which suggests a 
negative relationship between this variable and acquisition likelihood. All models also suggest 
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negative relationship between variable 16 (PAYOUT) and acquisition likelihood, which 
confirms the hypothesised sign of the dividend payout hypothesis.  
 
4.2 Multicollinearity Analysis  
The next step of the analysis is to eliminate multicollinearity from the four models to be 
estimated for significant parameter interpretation. Our analysis will focus on only one of the 
models from this point forward as reporting statistics for all models would not be feasible
20
. As 
the combined adjusted model theoretically has the highest predictive accuracy, our focus will be 
on this model. Appendix A reports the two sets of multicollinearity statistics for the combined 
adjusted model. Table A.1 presents the correlation matrix, which does not indicate that any 
extreme multicollinearity problems exist. Note that all correlations greater than 0.8 are presented 
in bold type. Examination of Table A.2, the Variance Inflation Factors, indicates a more 
widespread problem. Five variables in this figure exhibit Variance Inflation Factors which are 
extremely high. On the basis of these two figures, it was decided to eliminate five problematic 
variables – 2 (Return on Equity), 5 (FCF/TA), 13 (Current Ratio), 14 (Current Assets – Current 
Liabilities/Total Assets), and 19 (Total Liabilities/Total Assets). These variables either had a 
correlation coefficient with another explanatory variable greater than 0.8 or a VIF greater than 
10, and their elimination caused all statistics to return to normal levels. This process was 
repeated for the remaining three models. Appendix B lists the variables eliminated from these 
models, which range from three to five variables and generally conform to the same variable 
groups eliminated from the combined adjusted model. These models, which are theoretically free 
                                                          
20
 Detailed results for the remaining models are available on request from the author. Many of these are presented in 
the accompanying appendices of this thesis.  
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from multicollinearity, were used as a basis for the univariate comparison of means and the 
backward stepwise logistic regression.  
 
4.3 Univariate Comparison of Means  
Before the process of backward stepwise regression was conducted, a simpler methodology was 
employed to examine whether any significant differences existed between the means of targets 
and non-targets which may be indicative of the parameters to be estimated.  
 
Table Five – Univariate Comparison of Means for the Combined Adjusted Model. 
Variable  Non-Target Mean Target Mean t-statistic  
1 – ROA  -0.06 1.47 3.97 
4 – EBIT/SE -0.94 1.71 2.04 
6 – DIV/SE -0.57 0.20 1.84 
7 – EBIT GWTH -0.37 0.04 0.28 
8 – ACTIVITY 0.09 -0.58 -3.18 
9 – M/B 0.11 -0.04 -0.10 
10 – P/E -1.47 2.10 1.14 
12 – CAPEX/TA -0.27 0.36 3.38 
15 – QCK ASSETS 0.06 -0.26 -1.15 
16 – PAYOUT  -0.10 -0.70 -2.14 
17 – NET GEAR -0.12 0.43 0.96 
20 – LT DEBT/TA -0.25 0.11 1.60 
21 – INDUSTRY  0.93 0.97 0.28 
22 – Ln (TA) 0.00 0.07 3.55 
23 – NET ASSETS 1.43 0.61 -0.61 
Note: Reported t-statistics in bold type indicate that the mean values are significantly different between 
target and non-target firms at the 1 percent level of significance. A significantly positive (negative) t 
statistic suggests that the mean financial ratio for targets is significantly greater (smaller) than the mean 
financial ratio for non-targets. These statistics were generated from the same observations used for the 
estimation sample, containing 62 target and 63 non-target observations.  
 
 
Table Five presents the results of this comparison of means. Significant differences exist 
between the means of targets and non-targets for four of the variables which will be included in 
the backward stepwise regression, providing evidence for four of the eight hypothesised 
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motivations for takeover. This provides significant evidence against the results of Zanakis and 
Zopounidis (1997), which suggested that financial profiles of targets and non-targets were 
extremely similar. Variable one (ROA) suggests that targets outperform their non-target 
counterparts in terms of profitability, whilst variable eight (ACTIVITY) suggests that targets 
underperform in terms of revenue generating abilities. Variable twelve (CAPEX/TA) indicates 
that targets are spending a higher amount on capital expenditure, which implies large future 
growth opportunities relative to non-target firms. And, as in the initial estimation of all models, 
this comparison suggests that target firms are indeed larger than their non-target counterparts 
according to variable twenty two (Ln (TA)).  
 
4.4 Backward Stepwise Regression Results and Interpretation  
Using the same variables, a backward stepwise regression was performed with the purpose of 
retaining only those variables which are significant in explaining acquisition likelihood. The 
significance level for retention of variables in the analysis was set at 0.15 through the available 
SAS options, consistent with the methodology of Walter (1994). This was performed for all four 
models, as was the multicollinearity analysis, although the results for the remaining three models 
are reported in Appendix B. The backward stepwise analysis for the combined adjusted model 
eliminated six insignificant variables from a starting number of 15 variables, retaining nine 
significant variables as reported in Table Six below. These results are quite robust, as re-
examination of the comparison of means indicates that most of the significant variables from the 
backward stepwise regression are confirmed. Additionally, many of the confirmed variables for 
the combined adjusted model presented here are confirmed by a similar process for the 
remaining three models presented in Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3. Note that the industry disturbance 
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hypothesis (21) is not confirmed by the remaining three models, nor is it confirmed by the 
comparison of means, suggesting that the significance of this variable may be a spurious result. 
Additionally, the significance of variables for the inefficient financial structure hypothesis (17-
20) are not confirmed by the univariate comparison of means, but are confirmed by two of the 
remaining three backward stepwise logistic regressions, highlighting the robustness of the 
significance of variable 20.  
 
Table Six – Backward Stepwise Results for the Combined Adjusted Model 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate Prob > Chi Sq 
Intercept -0.04 (0.92) 
1 – ROA 0.28 (0.09) 
8 – ACTIVITY -0.54 (0.05) 
12 – CAPEX/TA 0.69 (<0.01) 
15 – QCK ASSETS 0.93 (0.02) 
16 – PAYOUT -0.34 (0.02) 
20 – LT DEBT/TA -0.32 (0.07) 
21 – INDUSTRY -0.59 (0.06) 
22 – LN (TA) 13.34 (<0.01) 
23 – NET ASSETS -0.21 (0.07) 
 
 
The first of the confirmed hypotheses is the inefficient management hypothesis, which is 
analysed by variables one to eight, although some of these were excluded due to 
multicollinearity and incomplete data. The positive coefficient estimate for variable one (ROA) 
indicates that an increase in operating performance increases the log odds of acquisition for a 
firm, which contradicts our a priori expectation for the sign of the estimated coefficient as we 
expect targets to underperform relative to industry averages. This contradicts the results of both 
Palepu (1986) and Walter (1994) who documented insignificance, but confirms the same result 
found by Barnes (1999) is his UK analysis of takeovers. This suggests that target firms have 
underlying businesses which are essentially profitable. The estimated coefficient for variable 
eight (ACTIVITY) suggests that a poor sales generating ability increases the log odds of 
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acquisition, providing evidence in favour of the inefficient management hypothesis and 
confirming the results of Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) and Barnes (1999). Taken together, these 
two variables suggest that targets are essentially profitable firms which are unable to generate the 
sales revenue to be competitive in their industries. Although this confirms the results of Barnes 
(1999), this thesis will provide evidence that outperformance of the industry in terms of ROA 
results from targets of friendly takeovers only, the significance of which will be discussed in 
Section 4.11. Relying solely on the binomial evidence at this point, one could conclude that 
targets are essentially profitable businesses with poor revenue generating abilities relative to their 
industries.  
 
The results for the growth resource mismatch hypothesis are somewhat more reliable. The 
estimated coefficient for variable twelve (CAPEX/TA) is significantly positive, which indicates 
that firms which have a relatively higher level of capital expenditure have higher log odds of 
acquisition. This leads to the conclusion that targets have higher future growth opportunities than 
non-target firms, but contradicts the growth variable of Palepu (1986) which indicated a negative 
relationship. Variable sixteen (PAYOUT) provides further evidence for this contention, as the 
negative coefficient indicates that firms which have higher payout ratios will generally have a 
lower log odds of acquisition. This suggests that firms which are paying out less of their 
earnings, and aggregating financial slack to exploit profitable future investment opportunities, 
are more likely to be acquired. These results provide strong evidence for the dividend payout 
hypothesis, which is surprising given that only Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) found it to be 
significant, and most other researchers have neglected to include it as an explanatory variable.  
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The growth variable results are confirmed by variable fifteen (QCK ASSETS). Its positive 
estimated coefficient suggests that firms with a higher level of current financial slack are more 
likely to be acquired. Taken together with variables twelve and sixteen, they suggest that targets 
are aggregating financial slack to exploit potentially profitable investment opportunities in the 
future. But it really does not provide any evidence for either of the forms of the growth resource 
mismatch hypotheses, which suggests that targets are suffering from an imbalance which must be 
rectified by an acquirer
21
. This contradicts the evidence of Palepu (1986) and Powell (2004), who 
document severe growth resource imbalances for target firms, although they disagree on the form 
of the imbalance. Our conclusion is that targets do not suffer from a growth resource imbalance, 
but are actually growing firms which seem to have the resources to exploit such opportunities 
without the help of an acquiring firm. This refutes the claim of these researchers that mergers 
and acquisitions are enacted to remove such imbalances.  
 
The results for the inefficient financial structure hypothesis are clearer. The negative coefficient 
estimate for variable twenty (LT DEBT/TA) confirms the results of Dietrich and Sorensen 
(1984) and Palepu (1986).  Interpretation of this coefficient indicates that target firms are under 
levered relative to other firms in their industry, as lower leverage results in higher log odds of 
acquisition. This result confirms the first interpretation of the inefficient financial structure 
hypothesis, as it seems that acquirers are attempting to exploit the underutilisation of debt by 
target management as proposed by Lewellen (1971). This contradicts the second interpretation of 
this hypothesis, as otherwise over-levered firms should have higher log odds of acquisition. 
                                                          
21
 Note that these variables are only significant within the adjusted models, as demonstrated in Appendix A. This 
suggests that the measurement of growth prospects and current liquidity must be made in an industry specific 
context. 
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There may be a number of reasons for this observation. As the Australian economy was in a 
period of expansion during the estimation period of 2003 and 2004, it is likely that acquirers 
were looking to acquire firms with what is the sole purpose of exploiting the benefits from a 
levered position
22
. Also, Private Equity Firms and many Investment Banks have been acquiring 
firms with what seems to be the sole purpose of loading them with an inconceivable level of 
debt. If they were maximising the potential returns from such a strategy, they would target 
relatively under levered firms. Our analysis seems to confirm such theories. These results would 
probably not hold in periods of recession or economic contraction. During such times, high 
levels of leverage can significantly decrease EPS, placing such over-levered firms in financial 
distress and most likely increasing their likelihood of acquisition. Our conclusion is that targets 
underutilise their debt capacity relative to their industry.    
 
Close inspection of the results would indicate that the estimated coefficient for variable twenty 
one (INDUSTRY) has the opposite sign to the hypothesised sign of this thesis. Both Palepu 
(1986) and Walter (1994) provided evidence of a positive relationship. Such significance may be 
a spurious result, as it is unconfirmed by the remaining three models presented in Appendix B 
and the univariate comparison of means in Table Five. Our hypothesis suggests that an industry 
which has been subject to some form of economic disturbance will have an abnormally high 
level of merger and acquisition activity which will persist for a wave period. But our result 
suggests the converse, indicating that firms in an industry which is in a wave period will have 
lower log odds of acquisition. To understand this result, we must acknowledge that the 
measurement of industry activity is made in the two years before firms are designated as target 
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 During periods of economic expansion, firms may substantially increase their EPS by increasing their leverage.  
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and non-target firms. The problem stems from the fact that periods of wave activity generally last 
no longer than two to three years (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). This may allow the wave of 
activity to have passed before the designation of target and non-target firms within industries, 
which suggests that industries may have reached the bottom of the activity cycle by the time that 
firms are designated. Our conclusion is that the result is consistent with the notion of merger and 
acquisition waves, but that such waves have lives of no more than two years.  
 
Close inspection will also reveal that the estimated coefficient for the size variable (22) is of the 
opposite sign to that expected a priori. Note that if we eliminate variable twenty three (NET 
ASSETS) from the analysis, as its estimated coefficient is economically insignificant, the 
estimated coefficient for variable twenty two (Ln (TA)) remains positive and significant. This is 
consistent across all four models. Only variable twenty two is confirmed by the univariate 
comparison of means. The positive coefficient indicates that larger firms have higher log odds of 
acquisition, which contradicts the reasoning and results of both Palepu (1986) and Walter (1994) 
which hypothesises a negative relationship. This result provides confirmation for the growth 
maximisation hypothesis of Marris (1963), which suggests that management of acquiring firms 
are more concerned with maximising the size of their firm than maximising shareholder welfare, 
as this maximises their pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards. Also supported is the agency 
hypothesis of Jensen (1986), which suggests that management will retain excess cash flows and 
invest them in negative NPV projects rather than returning them to shareholders with the purpose 
of maximising their value to shareholders. These results suggest that management are attempting 
to acquire larger targets because they are acting in their own self interests rather than the interests 
of shareholder welfare. This provides significant evidence in favour of the growth maximisation 
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hypothesis, which severely contradicts the results of many researchers who rely on the size 
hypothesis.   
 
It is obvious from an examination of the results that the two valuation ratios, variables nine 
(M/B) and ten (P/E), are insignificant in explaining acquisition likelihood. This is unlikely to be 
a spurious result, as this insignificance is confirmed across every single model estimated for the 
purposes of this study and by the univariate comparison of means. Insignificance of the M/B 
ratio confirms the experience of the extant literature, as no published study has shown this ratio 
to be significant in explaining acquisition likelihood. Note that both Walter (1994) and Bartley 
and Boardman (1990) found the current cost version of this variable, the Q ratio, to be one of the 
most significant discriminatory variables in their models. This confirms that the M/B ratio is an 
extremely inefficient proxy for the Q ratio, even though Australian companies are more regularly 
required to update the reported book values of assets. The insignificance of the P/E ratio is not 
surprising either, given that every published study cited in this paper has documented this 
variable to be insignificant in explaining acquisition likelihood. On the basis of these results, we 
conclude that undervaluation was not a motivation factor for takeovers during the sample period 
of 2003 and 2004 in the Australian context.  
 
4.5 Classification in the Estimation Period  
Figures Two and Three present the results of an estimation of the Palepu (1986) derived cutoff 
point for the combined adjusted model only. Using different bin ranges for their construction; 
both indicate that an optimal cutoff point exists at 0.675, which is the highest intersection of the 
estimated acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets.  
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Figure Two – Cutoff Calculations using the Palepu (1986) Methodology and 0.10 bin increments. 
 
 
Figure Three – Cutoff Calculations using the Palepu (1986) Methodology and 0.05 bin increments. 
 
 
Examination of these graphs indicates that the distribution of acquisition probabilities are not as 
clean as suggested in the methodological explanation of their derivation in Section 3.10. This 
results in a number of intersections for the distributions. The highest of these is selected as the 
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optimal cutoff point, as Barnes (1999) concluded that these lower potential cutoff probabilities 
had significantly lower predictive accuracies. This was also confirmed by this thesis, although no 
results are reported as the comparison of interest is between the two optimal cutoff derivations. 
This methodology was replicated for the remaining three models, the results of which are 
presented in Table Seven. 
 
Table Seven – Calculated Cutoff Probabilities for both Methodologies 
Optimal Cutoff 
 
Methodology 
Probabilities    Palepu Barnes  
Single Raw Model   0.725 0.850 
Single Adjusted Model 0.725 0.900 
Combined Raw Model 0.850 0.950 
Combined Adjusted Model 0.675 0.950 
 
 
Table Seven also reports the results from the calculation of the Barnes (1999) optimal cutoffs. 
Examination of these results indicates that the cutoff points derived under the Barnes (1999) 
methodology are significantly higher than those derived under the Palepu (1986) methodology, 
consistent with the outcomes of Powell (2001) and Barnes (1999). We would expect both smaller 
portfolios of predicted targets and higher concentration ratios under the former methodology. To 
examine the classification accuracy of these models, these cutoff points were utilised to classify 
all estimation sample firms. The estimation sample consisted of 1060 firms, of which 62 became 
targets during the sample period
23
. Classification results from an application of the Barnes (1999) 
derived cutoff point are presented in Table Eight, whilst identical results for the Palepu (1986) 
derived cutoff are presented in Appendix C. This allows us to make a comparison of these 
methodologies, as the inaccuracy of the Barnes (1999) models was such that neither 
methodology predicted any takeover targets accurately. 
                                                          
23
 Note that the number of sample firms differs between models because of reasons outlined in Section 3.7.  
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Table Eight – Estimation Sample Classifications using Barnes (1999) Optimal Cutoff 
Single Raw Model^ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 874 124 998 
Target 27 35 62 
Total 901 159 1060 
Concentration Ratio 22.01% 
Relative to Chance 276.34%* 
    Single Adjusted Model^ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 906 88 994 
Target 36 26 62 
Total 942 114 1056 
Concentration Ratio 22.81% 
Relative to Chance 288.46%* 
  Combined Raw Model^ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 935 61 996 
Target 43 19 62 
Total 978 80 1058 
Concentration Ratio 23.75% 
Relative to Chance 305.28%* 
  Combined Adjusted 
Model^ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 938 56 994 
Target 46 16 62 
Total 984 72 1056 
Concentration Ratio 22.22% 
Relative to Chance 278.49%* 
^ Indicates that the overall predictions of the model are significantly better than chance at the 1 percent 
level of significance according to the Proportional Chance Criterion.  
’ Indicates that the overall predictions of the model are significantly better than chance at the 5 percent 
level of significance according to the Proportional Chance Criterion.  
* Indicates that the prediction of targets individually is significantly greater than a chance selection at the 
1 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion.  
~ Indicates that the prediction of targets individually is significantly greater than a chance selection at the 
5 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion.  
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Table Eight provides outcome matrices for all of the models which are identical to the outcome 
matrix presented in Table Three. A number of important statistics can be readily generated from 
these results. All models exhibit significant values for the Proportional Chance Criterion, 
suggesting that they are all able to classify targets and non-targets jointly better than chance. All 
models also exhibit significant values for the Maximum Chance Criterion, suggesting that they 
are all able to classify target firms better than chance. Such accuracies are expected within the 
estimation sample, as all targets from this sample are used to estimate the models parameters. 
The most important statistic is the concentration ratio of Powell (2001), which is the ratio of 
actual targets in the portfolio of predicted targets (A11/TP1 from Table Three). Under a chance 
selection, one would expect to select a number of targets equal to their frequency of occurrence 
in the population of listed firms (TA1/T). To compare the concentration ratio to the chance 
benchmark, we simply divide the former ratio by the latter and minus one. A quick examination 
of these statistics indicates that the combined raw model provides the most accurate 
classifications within the estimation sample. Of the 80 firms that this model predicts to become 
takeover targets in the estimation period, 19 actually become targets, representing a 
concentration ratio (accuracy) of 23.75 percent. When taken relative to chance, this accuracy 
exceeds the benchmark by 305 percent.  These results confirm the high within-sample 
classification accuracies reported by researchers such as Powell (2001) and Walter (1994).  
 
Examination of Table C.1 in comparison to Table Eight highlights some interesting results for 
our methodological hypotheses. For all of the estimated models, use of the Palepu (1986) derived 
cutoff probability significantly increases the proportion of targets accurately classified as targets 
(A11/TA1 from Table Three). The problem stems from the fact that this is also accompanied by an 
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increase in the number of non-target firms incorrectly classified as targets by the models (A01, 
the Type II Error). This in turn significantly reduces the concentration ratio. As we are concerned 
with the concentration ratio for investment purposes, rather than the accurate classification of 
targets as targets, this reduces the theoretical accuracy of the model. This result stems from the 
different perspectives taken by these cutoff calculation methodologies. The Barnes (1999) 
methodology focuses on increasing results from a portfolio investment, and readily achieves this, 
providing evidence in favour of Hypothesis 11 of this thesis.  
 
4.6 Classification in the Prediction Period 
The estimated models were then extended to classification within the prediction period, as our 
interest is in the ex-ante predictive ability of the models rather than their ex-post classification 
abilities. Of 1054 firms in this sample, 108 actually became takeover targets during the sample 
period. This occurrence of targets is significantly larger than in the estimation sample (108 vs. 
62), suggesting a wave period during the prediction sample. Table Nine presents identical 
classification results to those presented in Table Eight, but for the prediction sample. Similar 
results for the Palepu derived cutoff point are presented in Appendix D.  
 
Calculation of the Proportional Chance Criterion suggests that only the combined adjusted model 
is able to predict targets and non-targets jointly better than chance. All models are able to predict 
targets individually greater than chance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion, which 
suggests significant accuracy. Comparison of models indicates that the combined adjusted model 
is the clear winner, as it has the highest concentration ratio, confirming our hypotheses. 
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Table Nine – Prediction Sample Outcomes using Barnes (1999) Optimal Cutoff 
Single Raw Model Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 856 90 946 
Target 92 16 108 
Total 948 106 1054 
Concentration Ratio 15.09% 
Relative to Chance 47.31%~ 
    Single Adjusted Model Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 816 128 944 
Target 84 24 108 
Total 900 152 1052 
Concentration Ratio 15.79% 
Relative to Chance 53.80%~ 
  Combined Raw Model Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 890 56 946 
Target 96 12 108 
Total 986 68 1054 
Concentration Ratio 17.65% 
Relative to Chance 72.22%* 
  Combined Adjusted 
Model’ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 841 100 941 
Target 83 25 108 
Total 924 125 1049 
Concentration Ratio 20.00% 
Relative to Chance 94.26%* 
^ Indicates that the overall predictions of the model are significantly better than chance at the 1 percent 
level of significance according to the Proportional Chance Criterion.  
’ Indicates that the overall predictions of the model are significantly better than chance at the 5 percent 
level of significance according to the Proportional Chance Criterion.  
* Indicates that the prediction of targets individually is significantly greater than a chance selection at the 
1 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion.  
~ Indicates that the prediction of targets individually is significantly greater than a chance selection at the 
5 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion.  
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Of the 125 firms predicted to become takeover targets by the combined adjusted model, 25 
actually do, suggesting an accuracy of 20 percent. Taken relative to chance, this exceeds the 
benchmark by some 94.26 percent. This predictive accuracy is comparable to the highest 
reported accuracies in the takeover prediction literature. Walter (1994) was able to predict some 
102 percent better than chance, but his sample was limited to firms which reported current cost 
data. Thus our study confirms this result in a larger sample, and refutes studies such as Palepu 
(1986) and Barnes (1999) that were unable to predict better than chance.  
 
The fact that the combined adjusted model reports the highest predictive accuracy confirms a 
number of the methodological hypotheses. Industry adjustment significantly increases predictive 
accuracy for both the single and combined models, confirming the stability argument of Platt and 
Platt (1990). The average of two years of pre-sample financial data also improves predictive 
accuracy, suggesting that such practices eliminate meaningless fluctuations in financial ratios to 
improve predictive accuracies. Hypotheses 9 and 10 are confirmed with significant strength. 
Examination of the results for Hypothesis 11 is not as clear. The predictive outcomes for the 
models based on the Palepu (1986) derived cutoff in Table D.1 indicate that this methodology 
increases the concentration ratio for the first three models, but reduces it for the combined 
adjusted models. This confirms the contention of Barnes (1999) that his derivation of the optimal 
cutoff point will only improve predictive accuracy where the distributions of estimated 
acquisition probabilities for targets and non-targets are stable over time. As the accuracy of the 
best model of this thesis are increased by the use of the Barnes (1999) derived cutoff point, and 
this methodology has theoretical strengths, we conclude in favour of Hypothesis 11 of this thesis. 
Our contention is that further research should implement only the Barnes (1999) derived cutoff 
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methodology. Future research should also examine methodologies to improve the stability of this 
optimal cutoff probability derivation. 
 
4.7 Elimination of Problematic Variables  
On the basis of these results, a number of different models were implemented to improve the 
accuracy of the two best predictive models – the combined raw model and the combined adjusted 
model. This was undertaken to improve accuracy in the estimation sample, replicating the 
problem faced by a practitioner. Our concerns were based on variables 9 (M/B) and 10 (P/E), the 
valuations ratios, as they were indicated to be insignificant in explaining acquisition likelihood in 
every model estimated to this point of the thesis and by the univariate comparison of means. 
Additionally, variable 7 (Sales Growth) seemed to be causing problems because it estimated 
growth over only a single year, making it extremely volatile.   
 
Table Ten – Application of improved models to Estimation Sample. 
Combined Raw Model^ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 941 55 996 
Target 44 18 62 
Total 985 73 1058 
Concentration Ratio 24.66% 
Relative to Chance 320.77%* 
  Combined Adjusted 
Model^ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 951 43 994 
Target 48 14 62 
Total 999 57 1056 
Concentration Ratio 24.56% 
Relative to Chance 318.34%* 
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Table Eleven – Application of improved models to Prediction Sample. 
Combined Raw Model Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 899 47 946 
Target 98 10 108 
Total 997 57 1054 
Concentration Ratio 17.54% 
Relative to Chance 71.22%* 
  Combined Adjusted Model Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 865 76 941 
Target 86 22 108 
Total 951 98 1049 
Concentration Ratio 22.45% 
Relative to Chance 118.05%* 
^ Indicates that the overall predictions of the model are significantly better than chance at the 1 percent 
level of significance according to the Proportional Chance Criterion.  
’ Indicates that the overall predictions of the model are significantly better than chance at the 5 percent 
level of significance according to the Proportional Chance Criterion.  
* Indicates that the prediction of targets individually is significantly greater than a chance selection at the 
1 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion.  
~ Indicates that the prediction of targets individually is significantly greater than a chance selection at the 
5 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion.  
 
The Sales Growth and P/E variables were eliminated from the combined raw model, and the 
Sales Growth, M/B and P/E variables were eliminated from the combined adjusted model. 
Elimination of these variables resulted in significant improvements in classification accuracy 
presented in Table Ten, with the concentration ratio for both models exceeding a chance 
selection by more than 300 percent. This accuracy was held into the prediction sample, the 
results of which are presented in Table Eleven. The accuracy of the combined adjusted model, at 
118 percent greater than chance, represents the highest accuracy reported by any published 
takeover prediction study. This is achieved by the prediction of 98 firms to become takeover 
targets, of which 22 actually become targets, providing a concentration ratio of 22.45 percent. 
These results strongly refute the claims of Barnes (1999) and Palepu (1986) which suggest that 
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such models cannot be implemented to achieve predictive accuracies greater than chance, and 
improves the reported accuracy of Walter (1994) in a wider sample of firms.  
 
Note that the combined adjusted model significantly outperforms all other models for predictive 
purposes, confirming that this is the most appropriate model for the application of logit models 
for the prediction of takeover targets in the Australian context. This provides further evidence in 
favour of Hypotheses 9 and 10 of this thesis. Our results suggest that inclusion of more than one 
variable for each of the hypothesised motivations for takeovers can significantly improve 
predictive accuracy, but that rejection of some variables where poor significance is consistently 
demonstrated can also improve predictive accuracy.  
 
4.8 Combination of Model Predictions  
Although the concentration ratio of the combined adjusted model is quite high, the occurrence of 
actual targets in the portfolio of predicted targets at a rate of only 22.45 percent is not feasible 
from an investment perspective. And a portfolio of 98 stocks is also still to large from an 
investment perspective. For a practitioner with limited funds, the transactions costs associated 
with any investment in such portfolios would erode any potential profit opportunity made 
available through the accuracy of the model. Only the commonly predicted targets across all six 
models estimated to this point were retained. This provided 14 predicted targets which are listed 
in Appendix E, Table E.1. One of these firms was actually delisted prior to the prediction 
sample, reducing the portfolio to only 13 firms
24
. Of these predicted targets, 5 actually became 
targets during the sample period, suggesting a concentration ratio of some 38.46 percent. This 
                                                          
24
 This occurred because all firms with accounting data were included in the samples to avoid survivorship bias in 
the calculation of industry relative ratios.  
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significantly outperforms the best single model which has a concentration ratio of only 22.45 
percent (the combined adjusted model in Table Eleven). Taken relative to chance, this exceeds 
the benchmark by some 274 percent, which is comparable to a single model classifying in the 
estimation period. This suggests that combinations of predictions across different methodologies 
can significantly improve concentration for investment purposes.  
 
4.9 Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns from Portfolio Investment  
The next stage of the process is to economically quantify the benefit from an investment in these 
predicted targets. If, according to Palepu (1986), the probability of takeover is impounded into 
the price of a stock, we should be unable to earn significantly positive abnormal returns from an 
investment in the predicted targets. The equally weighted portfolio approach was applied to these 
13 commonly predicted targets for the 2005 and 2006 calendar years. Table Twelve presents the 
results of this analysis over intervals of 20 days throughout this 504 trading day period. The first 
column, labelled Portfolio, presents the CAAR results for the full portfolio of 13 stocks. Over the 
entire prediction period, this portfolio earns a significantly positive abnormal return of 68.67 
percent. Such a result significantly exceeds any expectations for the abnormal performance of 
this portfolio.  
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Table Twelve – Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for portfolios during 2005 and 2006. 
Day Portfolio (13) Actual Targets (5) Robust Portfolio  
  CAAR (%)  CAAR (%)  CAAR (%)  
20 1.38% 5.36% 1.58% 
40 2.84% 10.50% 3.13% 
60 -1.98% 5.58% 1.69% 
80 -2.53% 6.11% 0.88% 
100 -5.52% -1.15% -1.86% 
120 4.40% 25.16% 8.35% 
140 3.06% 17.83% 7.23% 
160 4.38% 20.70% 8.77% 
180 5.51% 24.79% 10.10% 
200 9.90% 34.82% 14.24% 
220 7.51% 34.87% 12.16% 
240 6.40% 29.31% 11.00% 
260 5.04% 27.71% 10.18% 
280 4.77% 29.64% 9.87% 
300 4.67% 32.47% 10.05% 
320 3.08% 33.53% 8.94% 
340 0.73% 31.96% 6.93% 
360 2.89% 26.62% 8.19% 
380 5.28% 33.72% 11.05% 
400 6.99% 32.02% 12.41% 
420 9.78% 37.43% 15.48% 
440 11.33% 40.22% 17.15% 
460 57.44% 46.00% 20.33% 
480 58.38% 47.27% 21.50% 
500 68.90% 52.12% 23.41% 
503 68.67% 50.86% 23.37% 
SAR t-statistic 21.82 4.85 9.17 
Significance Level (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Walter t-statistic 43.75 22.73 14.89 
Significance Level (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Note: The second column of this figure presents the CAAR at 20 day intervals for the equally weighted 
portfolio of 13 stocks which were commonly predicted by the models. The third column presents 
identically calculated results for only the five actual targets within this portfolio, whilst the final column 
presents identical results to the second other than that the daily abnormal return to the stock ATM is set to 
zero.  
 
To confirm that this is driven by actual targets in the portfolio of predicted targets, the 
methodology is repeated for only the 5 actual targets in this portfolio. This provides evidence of 
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a significant abnormal return of 50.86 percent for the entire prediction period, confirming 
somewhat that the results are driven by the outperformance of actual targets
25
. But the CAAR of 
the portfolio is larger than the CAAR of the targets, suggesting that some actual non-targets in 
this portfolio significantly outperformed the benchmark. Examination of the individual stock 
CAR’s for the period indicates that the infrequently traded ATM is driving these significantly 
positive abnormal returns for the entire portfolio, especially between days 440 and 460 when the 
portfolio CAAR jumps from 11.33 percent to 57.44 percent. Throughout the prediction period, 
this stock had a CAR of some 422 percent. For the purposes of robustness, the daily abnormal 
returns of ATM were set to zero for the entire prediction period. Reapplication of the CAAR 
approach to the entire portfolio subsequent to this change provided the results in the final column 
of Table Twelve. This robustness adjusted portfolio reported a CAAR of 23.37 percent for the 
entire prediction period. Note that all reported CAAR’s were significantly greater than zero at 
the 1 percent level of significance under both methodologies.  
 
The abnormal performance of this robustness adjusted portfolio confirms to our chance 
expectations. If we assume that all targets outperform over the period by the 50.86 percent 
reported, and assume that on average non-targets in this portfolio perform with daily abnormal 
returns indifferent from zero, then we can calculate the expected abnormal return on the 
portfolio. Our calculations suggest an expected abnormal return of approximately 20 percent 
(38.46 percent multiplied by 50.86 percent). Even if the actual targets in this portfolio of 
predicted targets made a smaller abnormal return, say the 30 percent estimated by Jensen and 
Ruback (1983), we would still expect the portfolio abnormal return to be significantly positive at 
                                                          
25
 Announcement period abnormal returns of 50% are confirmed in the paper of Franks and Harris (1989), 
suggesting that our abnormal return results for targets are at the higher end of the range suggested by the literature.  
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12 percent (38.46 percent multiplied by 30 percent). Based on this reasoning, we believe that the 
calculated CAAR of 23.37 percent for the robustness adjusted portfolio is extremely accurate. A 
graphical representation of this result is presented in Figure Four. Examination of this suggests 
that the portfolio must be held for the entire prediction period. If one were to exit the portfolio at 
approximately day 350, one would have made returns insignificantly different from zero. These 
results also confirm that our results contain an element of chance. There is always the possibility 
that the non-targets in the portfolio will perform poorly enough to erode any profitability from an 
accurate selection of actual targets. Without perfect accuracy we cannot guarantee that 
application of the model for prediction will result in positive abnormal returns being made, but 
we believe that positive abnormal returns should be available with such accuracy on average.  
 
Figure Four – CAAR over time for the Robustness Adjusted Portfolio.  
 
 
 
Researchers such as Powell (2001) have launched specific attacks on the use of the CAPM as a 
returns benchmark on the basis of the size argument of Bansz (1981) and the fact that most 
targets are smaller than their non-target counterparts. They propose that the CAPM overestimates 
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abnormal returns in such situations. But this paper has documented that targets are larger than 
non-targets, which would suggest that the CAPM underestimates abnormal returns rather than 
overestimates. M/B ratios are also not significantly different between target and non-target firms, 
negating arguments put forward by researchers such as Fama and French (1993) concerning the 
applicability of the CAPM. This suggests that our estimated abnormal returns are extremely 
robust. Confirmation by a logical interpretation of the accuracy of the model confirms this 
robustness. Our conclusion is that significantly positive abnormal returns may be made from an 
investment in the commonly predicted targets of binomial logit models.  
 
The ability to earn significantly positive abnormal returns from the application of binomial 
models is a significant contradiction to the belief expressed in the extant literature. Palepu 
(1986), Walter (1994), and Powell (2001) all provide evidence that investment in predicted 
targets results in portfolio abnormal returns indistinguishable from zero. Barnes (1999) 
reinforced this, as his inability to predict any targets at all would result in the inability to make 
significant abnormal returns. Our results confirm the belief of Jensen and Ruback (1983) that the 
market is unable to predict such events with any accuracy in the months leading up to their 
announcement. They also suggest that the accuracy of the model is greater than that of the 
market in predicting these events, strongly refuting the beliefs expressed in the extant literature 
especially by researchers such as Palepu (1986) who contend that the probability of takeover is 
accurately impounded into the firm’s market value.   
 
4.10 Multinomial Logit Analysis – Successful and Unsuccessful Takeovers  
To examine whether such predictive accuracies can be improved, the multinomial models were 
estimated. Table Thirteen presents the results of a differentiation between successful and 
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unsuccessful takeovers and non-targets using the multinomial logit model. This model was based 
on the same 62 target observations, split into 45 successful and 17 unsuccessful takeovers. 
 
Table Thirteen – Results from estimation of the multinomial logit model within the combined 
adjusted model framework. 
  Parameter Estimates 
Variable  
Successful Target 
vs. Non-Target 
Unsuccessful Target 
vs. Non-Target  
Successful Target 
vs. Unsuccessful 
Target 
Intercept  -1.62 -1.67 0.06 
1 – ROA   0.23 0.93 -0.70 
4 – EBIT/SE 0.06 -0.02 0.09 
6 – DIV/SE 0.58 -0.44 1.02 
7 – EBIT GWTH -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
8 – ACTIVITY -2.24 -0.09 -2.15 
9 – M/B -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
10 – P/E 0.03 0.03 0.00 
12 – CAPEX/TA 0.86 0.51 0.36 
15 – QCK ASSETS -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
16 – PAYOUT -0.34 -0.24 -0.11 
17 – NET GEAR 0.01 0.01 0.00 
20 – LT DEBT/TA 0.01 -0.25 0.26 
21 – INDUSTRY -0.45 -0.77 0.32 
22 – Ln (TA) 13.62 4.32 9.29 
23 – NET ASSETS -0.24 -0.14 -0.10 
Likelihood Ratio 133.22 Likelihood Deviance 0.49 
Pr > Chi Sq 0.0000 Pr > Chi Sq 0.0006 
Note: Coefficients in bold type indicate significance at the 10 percent level. The likelihood deviance 
statistic indicates whether all coefficients are identical between successful and unsuccessful targets, with a 
significant value indicating a significant difference in determination factors for each category and a 
conclusion that the binomial model is misspecified. 
 
 
The likelihood deviance statistic is significant beyond the 1 percent level, suggesting that 
significant differences exist between the characteristics of successful and unsuccessful takeover 
targets. This is confirmed by the likelihood ratio of the multinomial model (133.22), which is 
significantly larger than the likelihood ratio of the binomial model in Table Four (67.88), 
suggesting increased explanatory power for the multinomial model. Note that the estimated 
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parameters indicate the impact of a change in the explanatory variable on the log odds of 
becoming a successful and unsuccessful takeover target respectively (in columns one and two). 
The final column indicates whether any significant differences exist between these 
discriminating factors of successful and unsuccessful takeover targets.  
 
Examination of the multinomial results indicates that targets of successful targets have 
significantly lower activity (8) than non-targets, whilst unsuccessful targets do not. Targets of 
unsuccessful bids actually outperform in terms of profitability (1), whilst successful targets do 
not. Taken together, these results suggest that it is the targets of successful takeovers which are 
inefficiently managed, and that targets of unsuccessful takeovers are driving the high 
profitability performance of targets suggested by the binomial model. To interpret this result, it 
could be that the acquirer, through their due diligence, realises that the efficiency of the target is 
not poor enough to allow capital gains or increased dividends to be realised through takeover. 
This would result in an unsuccessful takeover bid. It could also be that target shareholders in 
unsuccessful bids do not accept the bid because they believe that their management team is 
performing adequately, which is confirmed by the results. The results also indicate that 
successful targets are significantly larger (22) than non-targets, although unsuccessful targets are 
not. To understand this result, we must realise that the size of a firm is a close proxy for the age 
of the firm (Barnes, 1990). A potential acquirer may launch a bid for a small (young) target, but 
subsequently realise that the track record of the target is insufficient to allow proper examination 
of the firm. This could lead them to withdraw their bid. A univariate comparison of mean 
financial ratios between successful targets/non-targets and unsuccessful targets/non-targets is 
presented in Appendix F. These results should be indicative of the estimated parameters 
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determining the likelihood of these events in the multinomial model. Examination of these 
results indicate that every one of the significant factors in the multinomial model are confirmed, 
highlighting the robustness of the reported results. Overall, the results suggest that the binomial 
model is misspecified for the purposes of parameter interpretation.  
 
Table Fourteen – Application of the Multinomial Model within the Combined Adjusted 
Framework for the prediction of successful takeover targets only.  
ESTIMATION SAMPLE Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target/Unsuccessful Successful Target Total 
Non-Target 879 115 994 
Unsuccessful Target 13 4 17 
Successful Target 19 26 45 
Total 911 145 1056 
Concentration Ratio 20.69%* 
Successful Target Concentration Ratio 17.93% 
 
 
 
  PREDICTION SAMPLE Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target/Unsuccessful Successful Target Total 
Non-Target 804 137 941 
Unsuccessful Target 14 8 22 
Successful Target 66 20 86 
Total 884 165 1049 
Concentration Ratio 16.97%~ 
Successful Target Concentration Ratio 12.12% 
    BINOMIAL MODEL Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target/Unsuccessful Successful Target Total 
Non-Target 865 76 941 
Unsuccessful Target 14 8 22 
Successful Target 72 14 86 
Total 951 98 1049 
Concentration Ratio 22.45%* 
Successful Target Concentration Ratio 14.29% 
* Indicates that the prediction of successful and unsuccessful targets jointly is significantly greater than 
chance at the 1 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion.  
~ Indicates that the prediction of successful and unsuccessful targets jointly is significantly greater than 
chance at the 5 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion. 
^ Indicates that the prediction of successful targets individually is greater than chance at the 1 percent 
level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion.  
89 | P a g e  
 
On the basis of this estimated model, the multinomial framework was extended to classify targets 
of successful takeovers individually, as this has been suggested to increase abnormal returns 
from a portfolio investment. Results from the application of this model to the estimation and 
prediction samples are presented in Table Fourteen, along with identical results for the binomial 
model from the prediction period. Our best binomial model, the combined adjusted model, 
reports a concentration ratio of 22.45 percent, whilst the multinomial prediction of successful 
targets has a concentration ratio of only 16.97 percent. We expect a trade-off in this situation – 
attempting to increase the proportion of successful targets in the portfolio of predicted targets 
(which should theoretically increase abnormal returns) should also reduce our overall predictive 
accuracy measured by the concentration ratio (which should theoretically decrease abnormal 
returns). But an analysis of the tables indicates that the multinomial model predicts a smaller 
concentration ratio of successful targets than the binomial model (12.12 percent versus 14.29 
percent). A smaller concentration ratio and an inability to predict a higher proportion of 
successful targets lead us to the conclusion that the application of the multinomial model will not 
improve abnormal returns. Although our results suggest that the binomial model is misspecified 
relative to the multinomial model, they also indicate that the binomial framework is the most 
appropriate to predict takeover targets for investment purposes.  
 
4.11 Multinomial Logit Analysis – Hostile and Friendly Takeovers  
Table Fifteen presents the results of a similarly estimated multinomial model which attempts to 
discriminate between hostile and friendly takeover targets and non-targets. The 62 targets from 
the initial estimation sample were split into 21 hostile and 41 friendly targets. Significance of the 
likelihood deviance statistic at the 2 percent level again suggests that the binomial model is 
misspecified. Examination of the likelihood ratio for the multinomial model (159.38), versus the 
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likelihood ratio for the binomial model in Table Four (67.88), suggests that the multinomial 
model has a higher level of explanatory power.  
 
Table Fifteen – Results from the estimation of the multinomial logit within the combined 
adjusted framework to differentiate between targets of hostile and friendly takeovers. 
  Parameter Estimates 
Variable  
Hostile Target vs. 
Non-Target 
Friendly Target vs. 
Non-Target 
Hostile Target vs. 
Friendly Target 
Intercept  -1.35 -1.75 0.39 
1 – ROA   0.41 0.74 -0.32 
4 – EBIT/SE -0.04 0.04 -0.08 
6 – DIV/SE 0.37 0.19 0.19 
7 – EBIT GWTH -0.01 -0.04 0.03 
8 – ACTIVITY -1.55 -0.26 -1.29 
9 – M/B 0.09 0.02 0.07 
10 – P/E 0.08 0.03 0.05 
12 – CAPEX/TA 0.87 0.73 0.14 
15 – QCK ASSETS 0.09 -0.49 0.58 
16 – PAYOUT -0.22 -1.18 0.96 
17 – NET GEAR 0.04 0.03 0.01 
20 – LT DEBT/TA -0.40 0.20 -0.60 
21 – INDUSTRY -0.40 -0.84 0.44 
22 – Ln (TA) 14.62 3.76 10.85 
23 – NET ASSETS -0.27 -0.10 -0.17 
Likelihood Ratio 159.39 Likelihood Deviance -0.33 
Pr > Chi Sq 0.0011 Pr > Chi Sq 0.0127 
Note: Coefficients in bold type indicate significance at the 10 percent level. The likelihood deviance 
statistic indicates whether all coefficients are identical between hostile and friendly targets, with a 
significant value indicating a significant difference in determination factors for each category and a 
conclusion that the binomial model is misspecified.  
 
The estimated coefficients suggest that poor activity performance (8) is a characteristic of hostile 
targets, and not of friendly targets. This confirms the belief of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1988) that hostile takeovers are enacted to discipline target management. The results also 
suggest that outperformance in profitability terms (1) is the result of friendly targets and not 
hostile targets. This confirms the contention of Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) that friendly 
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takeovers are enacted more for the synergistic benefits available from takeovers, as this suggests 
that they are not undertaken to discipline target management for poor performance. These results 
are quite consistent with the multinomial results of Powell (1997, 2004). Hostile targets are also 
significantly larger (22) than non-targets, whilst friendly targets are not. This confirms the results 
of Powell (1997), who also suggests that targets of hostile takeovers are significantly larger than 
targets of friendly takeovers. Also confirmed is the Australian evidence of Eddey (1991), which 
suggested that the targets of corporate raiders were significantly larger than targets of other 
takeovers. His reasoning was that such corporate raiders were attempting some sort of empire 
building exercise. It may be that hostile acquirers are also attempting a similar form of empire 
building, which would be consistent with the growth maximisation and agency costs of free cash 
flow arguments presented in the literature review and documented in the binomial model. These 
results suggest that acquirers in friendly acquisitions do not suffer from the same behavioural 
biases.  
 
 
A univariate comparison of mean financial ratios for hostile targets/non-targets and friendly 
targets/non-targets is presented in Appendix G. Significant differences in mean financial ratios 
should be indicative of the significant parameters estimated in the multinomial model. But unlike 
the two uses of such univariate comparisons earlier in the thesis, these results are different to the 
model they are providing robustness checks for. The results suggest outcomes more consistent 
with the binomial model, as the characteristics of hostile and friendly targets are similar. Such 
contradictory evidence is surprising, and may result from the small number of hostile targets 
included in this analysis. Zanakis and Zopounidis (1997) also suggest that this may result from 
the non-normality of financial ratios utilised for comparison, which invalidates the t test 
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methodology in serious cases. We are inclined to the robustness of the multinomial logit results 
as they do not require such assumptions of normality, and conclude that significant differences 
exist between the characteristics of hostile and friendly takeover targets.  
 
Table Sixteen – Application of the Multinomial Model within the Combined Adjusted 
Framework for the prediction targets of hostile takeovers only.   
ESTIMATION SAMPLE Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target/Friendly Hostile Target Total 
Non-Target 909 85 994 
Friendly Target 33 8 41 
Hostile Target 15 6 21 
Total 957 99 1056 
Concentration Ratio 14.14%~ 
Hostile Target Concentration Ratio 6.06% 
    PREDICTION SAMPLE Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target/Friendly Hostile Target Total 
Non-Target 771 170 941 
Friendly Target 58 23 81 
Hostile Target 21 6 27 
Total 850 199 1049 
Concentration Ratio 14.57%~ 
Hostile Target Concentration Ratio 3.02% 
    BINOMIAL MODEL Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target/Friendly Hostile Target Total 
Non-Target 865 76 941 
Friendly Target 66 15 81 
Hostile Target 20 7 27 
Total 951 98 1049 
Concentration Ratio 22.45%~ 
Hostile Target Concentration Ratio 7.14% 
* Indicates that the prediction of successful and unsuccessful targets jointly is significantly greater than 
chance at the 1 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion.  
~ Indicates that the prediction of successful and unsuccessful targets jointly is significantly greater than 
chance at the 5 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion. 
^ Indicates that the prediction of successful targets individually is greater than chance at the 1 percent 
level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion.  
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As in the case of successful takeovers, the multinomial model was applied to select only targets 
of hostile takeovers, the results of which are presented in Table Sixteen with identical prediction 
results for the binomial model. Again we expect that an identical trade-off will exist – although 
the multinomial model may sacrifice concentration of all types of targets in the portfolio of 
predicted targets (which should theoretically reduce abnormal returns), one would expect it to 
increase the concentration of hostile takeover targets in this portfolio (which should theoretically 
increase abnormal returns). But examination of the portfolios of predicted targets indicates that 
the binomial model has a higher concentration ratio for hostile takeover targets (7.14 percent for 
the binomial model and 3.02 percent for the multinomial model). This, combined with a 
decreased general concentration ratio (14.57 percent for the multinomial model versus 22.45 
percent for the binomial model), suggests that returns from investment in predicted hostile 
targets will be smaller than an investment in the predicted targets of the binomial model. This 
inaccuracy probably results from only 21 hostile takeovers being included in the estimation 
sample. We could possibly increase the length of the estimation sample to include more hostile 
target observations. But this may reduce the currency of the estimated parameters, which we 
believe is integral to the high predictive accuracies reported by this thesis. Based on these two 
multinomial models, it is obvious that the binomial model is superior if purpose of prediction is 
investment in predicted targets. This contradicts the proposal of Hypothesis 12 which suggests 
that implementation of the multinomial model should improve the concentrations of successful 
and hostile takeover targets in the portfolios of predicted targets. It also contradicts the results of 
Powell (2004), which suggested that an investment in predicted hostile targets improved returns 
significantly over an investment in predictions of the binomial model.  
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5. Conclusions  
This thesis has extended the takeover prediction literature in a number of key areas. Firstly, an 
analysis of the hypothesised motivations for takeover provided evidence of six of the eight 
hypothesised motivations developed in our literature review. Targets are profitable but have poor 
revenue generating abilities. They are aggregating financial slack by paying out less of their 
earnings and investing a high level of this aggregated slack in future growth projects. They are 
underutilising their debt capacity. They are part of industries which have experienced high levels 
of takeover activity. And they are generally larger than their non-target counterparts. Significant 
evidence was also provided suggesting that significant motivational differences exist between 
successful and unsuccessful takeovers, and between hostile and friendly takeovers. Hostile 
takeovers are demonstrated to be undertaken for disciplinary reasons, whilst friendly takeovers 
are demonstrated to be undertaken for synergistic benefits. Successful takeovers are made for 
targets which seem to be underperforming and have profitable future investment opportunities, 
whilst unsuccessful takeover bids are made for targets which seem to be efficiently managed. 
This evidence confirms recent contentions that the binomial model is misspecified; suggesting 
that disaggregation of the target category must be undertaken to allow appropriate parameter 
interpretation.  
 
Secondly, empirical application of binomial models for classification and prediction suggests 
that they can be implemented with accuracy significantly greater than chance. The best 
individual model, the combined adjusted model, is able to predict targets with accuracy some 
118 percent better than chance. This outcome refutes the conclusions of the extant literature, 
whilst furthering similar small sample results of Walter (1994). This accuracy is achieved whilst 
95 | P a g e  
 
exploring the most appropriate methodology for prediction. Our results confirm that the binomial 
model which utilises industry adjustment and averages of pre-sample financial data significantly 
outperforms the predictive accuracy of alternative model methodologies. Evidence also suggests 
that the application of the Barnes (1999) derived optimal cutoff point is empirically problematic.  
 
Thirdly, the paper indicates that selecting only commonly predicted targets across a number of 
methodologies can significantly improve predictive accuracy (concentration) and reduce the 
portfolio of predicted targets to a reasonable level for investment purposes. A portfolio of 13 
commonly predicted targets across our four model specifications contains 5 actual takeover 
targets, an accuracy which exceeds the chance benchmark by some 274 percent. This portfolio is 
also significantly more accurate than the implementation of any single model for prediction. 
Although our paper combined predictions across different binomial logit methodologies, future 
research could examine the viability of combining predictions across binomial and discriminant 
analysis methodologies, or using multiple layer neural networks to filter the predicted targets of 
one of these methodologies.  
 
Fourthly, evidence is provided concerning the ability of multinomial logit models to outperform 
the predictive accuracies of binomial models for the prediction of successful takeover targets and 
hostile takeover targets individually. Although our evidence confirms the contention of Powell 
(1997, 2004) that the binomial model is indeed misspecified, our results indicate that the 
binomial model is the most appropriate for the purposes of ex-ante prediction (when investment 
is the purpose of prediction). Multinomial models are unable to predict a higher concentration of 
targets in the portfolio of predicted targets, and also unable to predict a higher concentration of 
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either successful or hostile targets. These results suggest that returns would be significantly 
reduced from an investment in the multinomial model predictions. Future research should 
reconsider the applicability of the multinomial model to prediction for investment purposes, as 
larger samples should improve their ability to select the targets of interest.  
 
Finally, this paper provides evidence that significant positive abnormal returns may be made 
from an investment in the commonly predicted targets of binomial logit models. Over a two year 
holding period, our portfolio of predicted targets reports a significantly positive CAAR of 23.37 
percent after robustness adjustments (68.67 percent prior to robustness adjustments). No 
published binomial logit study employing the correct sampling methodology has reported such a 
result. We believe this accuracy stems from the strict application of all methodological 
improvements suggested by the literature, and the use of a number of different methodologies to 
discern only commonly predicted targets. Researchers such as Rege (1984) have proposed that 
such ability contradicts the Efficient Markets Hypothesis for reasons explained in Section 1.2 of 
this thesis. We resist drawing such conclusions. Fama (1998) argues that we must provide 
significant and consistent evidence of an anomaly, as one result such as ours may be the result of 
chance rather than an empirical fact. And until our model predicts with 100 percent accuracy, 
there is still the chance that non-targets predicted to be targets may perform so poorly that any 
abnormal returns made by actual non targets are eroded by the non-targets predicted to be 
targets. Even so, our conclusion is that significantly positive abnormal returns may be made from 
an investment in the commonly predicted targets of binomial logit models.  
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APPENDIX A – MULTICOLLINEARITY ANALYSIS 
 
Table A.1 – Correlogram for the Combined Adjusted Model 
VAR 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 13 14 15 16 17 19 20 21 22 23 
1 1.00 
                  
  
2 0.44 1.00 
                 
  
4 0.49 0.84 1.00 
                
  
5 -0.67 -0.67 -0.16 1.00 
               
  
6 0.47 0.47 0.67 -0.21 1.00 
              
  
7 0.06 0.06 0.11 -0.03 0.08 1.00 
             
  
8 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.09 0.06 -0.18 1.00 
            
  
9 -0.17 -0.37 -0.51 0.14 -0.60 0.02 0.06 1.00 
           
  
10 0.04 0.08 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.14 -0.10 1.00 
          
  
12 -0.27 0.03 0.14 0.28 0.12 0.07 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 1.00 
         
  
13 0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 0.01 -0.09 -0.16 1.00 
        
  
14 0.38 0.01 0.03 -0.76 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.12 0.00 -0.07 0.16 1.00 
       
  
15 -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.11 0.01 -0.08 -0.12 0.96 0.14 1.00 
      
  
16 0.18 0.08 0.08 -0.09 0.20 0.03 0.37 -0.03 0.05 -0.11 -0.07 0.03 -0.08 1.00 
     
  
17 0.26 0.20 0.22 -0.11 0.31 0.08 -0.08 -0.13 -0.08 0.00 -0.12 0.03 -0.11 -0.07 1.00 
    
  
19 -0.42 0.02 0.00 0.84 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.20 -0.16 -0.97 -0.15 -0.02 0.00 1.00 
   
  
20 -0.13 0.21 0.19 0.31 0.09 0.08 -0.06 -0.10 0.01 0.66 -0.16 -0.02 -0.15 -0.05 0.18 0.22 1.00 
  
  
21 0.24 0.04 0.29 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.05 -0.18 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.09 0.09 0.04 0.07 1.00 
 
  
22 0.53 0.24 0.28 -0.44 0.19 0.12 -0.07 -0.01 0.05 -0.15 -0.13 0.20 -0.14 0.13 0.19 -0.19 0.10 0.10 1.00   
23 0.19 0.13 0.09 -0.11 0.12 0.01 -0.20 0.00 0.01 -0.11 -0.11 0.03 -0.09 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.64 1.00 
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Table A.2 – Variance Inflation Factors for the Combined Adjusted Model 
 
VARIANCE INFLATION 
FACTORS 
1 – ROA 4.70 
2 – ROE 5.14 
4 – EBIT/SE 6.20 
5 – FCF/TA 13.77 
6 – DIV/SE 3.79 
7 – EBIT GWTH 1.18 
8 – ACTIVITY 1.95 
9 – M/B 2.42 
10 – P/E 1.11 
12 – CAPEX/TA 2.74 
13 – CURRENT 17.79 
14 – (CA-CL)/TA 51.93 
15 – QCK ASSETS 16.82 
16 – PAYOUT 1.52 
17 – NET GEAR 1.32 
19 – TL/TA 71.58 
20 – LT DEBT/TA 4.71 
21 – INDUSTRY 1.60 
22 – Ln (TA) 3.61 
23 – NET ASSETS 2.17 
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APPENDIX B – BACKWARD STEPWISE LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS  
 
Table B.1 – Backward Stepwise Results for Single Raw Model 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate Prob > Chi Sq 
Intercept -13.14 (<0.01) 
8 – ACTIVITY  -0.64 (0.07) 
16 – PAYOUT  -3.01 (<0.01) 
22 – LN (TA) 0.78 (<0.01) 
23 – NET ASSETS 0.00 (<0.01) 
   * Variables 2, 5, 10, and 13 were eliminated due to their potential to cause problems of multicollinearity.  
 
Table B.2 – Backward Stepwise Results for Single Adjusted Model 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate Prob > Chi Sq 
Intercept -0.58 (0.02) 
8 – ACTIVITY  -0.59 (0.03) 
12 – CAPEX/TA 0.34 (0.07) 
16 – PAYOUT  -0.22 (0.07) 
20 – LT DEBT/TA -0.21 (0.11) 
22 – LN (TA) 12.07 (<0.01) 
23 – NET ASSETS -0.19 (0.09) 
* Variables 2, 13, and 19 were eliminated due to their potential to cause problems of multicollinearity.  
 
Table B.3 – Backward Stepwise Results for Combined Raw Model 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate Prob > Chi Sq 
Intercept -12.36 (<0.01) 
6 – DIV/SE  7.90 (0.02) 
8 – ACTIVITY  -0.65 (0.08) 
16 – PAYOUT  -2.61 (<0.01) 
17 – NET GEAR -0.54 (0.01) 
22 – LN (TA) 0.74 (<0.01) 
23 – NET ASSETS 0.00 (0.01) 
* Variables 4, 5, 13, 15, and 19 were eliminated due to their potential to cause problems of 
multicollinearity.  
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APPENDIX C – PALEPU CUTOFF ESTIMATION CLASSIFICATIONS  
 
Table C.1 
Single Raw Model^ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 812 186 998 
Target 18 44 62 
Total 830 230 1060 
Concentration Ratio 19.13% 
Relative to Chance 227.07%* 
    Single Adjusted Model^ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 787 207 994 
Target 20 42 62 
Total 807 249 1056 
Concentration Ratio 16.87% 
Relative to Chance 187.29%* 
  Combined Raw Model^ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 840 156 996 
Target 24 38 62 
Total 864 194 1058 
Concentration Ratio 19.59% 
Relative to Chance 234.25%* 
  Combined Adjusted 
Model^ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 749 245 994 
Target 19 43 62 
Total 768 288 1056 
Concentration Ratio 14.93% 
Relative to Chance 154.30%* 
^ Indicates that the overall predictions of the model are significantly better than chance at the 1 percent 
level of significance according to the Proportional Chance Criterion.  
’ Indicates that the overall predictions of the model are significantly better than chance at the 5 percent 
level of significance according to the Proportional Chance Criterion.  
* Indicates that the prediction of targets individually is significantly greater than a chance selection at the 
1 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion.  
~ Indicates that the prediction of targets individually is significantly greater than a chance selection at the 
5 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion. 
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APPENDIX D – PALEPU CUTOFF PREDICTION CLASSIFICATIONS  
 
Table D.1 
Single Raw Model’ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 773 173 946 
Target 73 35 108 
Total 846 208 1054 
Concentration Ratio 16.83% 
Relative to Chance 64.22%~ 
    Single Adjusted Model^ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 699 245 944 
Target 55 53 108 
Total 754 298 1052 
Concentration Ratio 17.79% 
Relative to Chance 73.24%* 
  Combined Raw Model’ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 800 146 946 
Target 77 31 108 
Total 877 177 1054 
Concentration Ratio 17.51% 
Relative to Chance 70.92%* 
  Combined Adjusted 
Model^ Predicted Outcome   
Actual Outcome Non-Target Target Total 
Non-Target 668 273 941 
Target 53 55 108 
Total 721 328 1049 
Concentration Ratio 16.77% 
Relative to Chance 62.87%~ 
^ Indicates that the overall predictions of the model are significantly better than chance at the 1 percent 
level of significance according to the Proportional Chance Criterion.  
’ Indicates that the overall predictions of the model are significantly better than chance at the 5 percent 
level of significance according to the Proportional Chance Criterion.  
* Indicates that the prediction of targets individually is significantly greater than a chance selection at the 
1 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion.  
~ Indicates that the prediction of targets individually is significantly greater than a chance selection at the 
5 percent level of significance according to the Maximum Chance Criterion.  
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APPENDIX E – PORTFOLIO OF COMMONLY PREDICTED TARGETS 
 
Table E.1 – Portfolio of Commonly Predicted Targets 
ASX 
Code Full Name Bid Date  
ATM Aneka Tambang Tbk N/A 
LIM Lionore Mining International Ltd N/A 
ALN Alinta Limited 13/03/2006 
APA APA Group N/A 
GAS GasNet Australia Group 19/06/2006 
PHY Pacific Hydro Ltd 29/03/2005 
SAX Stadium Australia Group 15/11/2006 
BPC Burns, Philp, and Company N/A 
MCG Macquarie Communications Infrastructure Group N/A 
VBA Virgin Blue Holdings Ltd 28/01/2005 
AUN Austar United Communications Ltd N/A 
FXJ Fairfax Media Ltd N/A 
REG RG Capital Radio Ltd Delisted 
SIG Sigma Company Ltd N/A 
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APPENDIX F – UNIVARIATE COMPARISON OF MEANS FOR SUCCESSFUL AND 
UNSUCCESSFUL TARGETS VERSUS NON-TARGETS 
 
 TABLE F.1 Successful Target 
Mean vs. Non-
Target Mean 
Unsuccessful Target 
Mean vs. Non-
Target Mean   
Variable t-statistic t-statistic 
1 – ROA 3.40 (+) 2.60 (+) 
4 – EBIT/SE  1.89 1.59 
6 – DIV/SE 1.41 1.00 
7 – EBIT GWTH 0.23 0.18 
8 – ACTIVITY -3.44 (-) -2.42 
9 – M/B -0.19 -0.11 
10 – P/E 1.01 0.68 
12 – CAPEX/TA 2.79 (+) 1.96 
15 – QCK ASSETS -1.05 -0.97 
16 – PAYOUT -2.48 -1.81 
17 – NET GEAR 0.90 0.63 
20 – LT DEBT/TA 1.55 1.15 
21 – INDUSTRY 0.25 0.16 
22 – Ln (TA) 3.30 (+) 2.57 
23 – NET ASSETS -0.60 -0.56 
Note: Reported t-statistics in bold type indicate that the mean values are significantly different between 
target and non-target firms at the 1 percent level of significance. Significantly positive (negative) values 
indicate that the mean financial ratio of the type of target under consideration is significantly larger 
(smaller) than the mean financial ratio for non-targets.  
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APPENDIX G – UNIVARIATE COMPARISON OF MEANS FOR HOSTILE AND 
FRIENDLY TARGETS VERSUS NON-TARGETS 
 
 TABLE G.1 Hostile Target Mean 
vs. Non-Target 
Mean 
Friendly Target 
Mean vs. Non-
Target Mean   
Variable t-statistic t-statistic 
1 – ROA 3.53 (+) 2.74 (+) 
4 – EBIT/SE 1.92 1.64 
6 – DIV/SE 1.51 1.02 
7 – E IT GWTH 0.25 0.18 
8 – A TIVITY -3.00 (-) -2.99 (-) 
9 – M/B -0.10 -0.16 
10 – P/E 0.99 0.73 
12 – CAPEX/TA 2.88 (+) 2.06 
15 – QCK ASSETS -1.11 -0.97 
16 – PAYOUT -2.08 -2.33 
17 – NET GEAR 0.85 0.70 
20 – LT DEBT/TA 1.47 1.27 
21 – INDUSTRY 0.25 0.18 
22 – Ln (TA) 3.28 (+) 2.76 (+) 
23 – NET ASSETS -0.60 -0.54 
Note: Reported t-statistics in bold type indicate that the mean values are significantly different between 
target and non-target firms at the 1 percent level of significance. Significantly positive (negative) values 
indicate that the mean financial ratio of the type of target under consideration is significantly larger 
(smaller) than the mean financial ratio for non-targets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
